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An Introduction To The Contemporary History Of

LATIN AMERICA

by

REVILO P. OLIVER

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LATIN AMERICA

by

Revilo P. Oliver

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Dear Reader:

In the earliest numbers of *One Man's Opinion*, the predecessor to this magazine, we repeatedly confessed that it was an obsession with us "to see the picture whole." This attitude accounts for much of the editorial policy we have followed ever since. And our outlook has not changed.

Today there are an almost infinite number of articles and reports about developments in Latin America, being served to the American people in the press and on the air. And most of them are by columnists, pseudo-pundits, and commentators who have about as much background knowledge for the job as if they were writing on the prevalence of ancestral pride among the inhabitants of Mars.

We can do very little about the arrogance of ignorance which has now replaced the humility of scholarship in so many of the sources from which Americans get their prefabricated opinions and prejudices. But with regard to one huge and crucial front of the Cold War that is engulfing us, we herewith hand our readers as brilliant a summarization of the historical background as you are ever likely to read on any subject.

In the present insidious but rapid take-over of Latin America by the Communists, their drive for global conquest is drawing ever closer to the final showdown within the United States. For an understanding of the forces at work, of the past and of the present, in bringing about the disastrous developments to the South which are now unfolding before us, we believe you will find your "time's worth" in the following pages.

Sincerely,

Robert Welch

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An Introduction To The Contemporary History Of

LATIN AMERICA

by

REVILO P. OLIVER

FOREWORD

THE UNITED STATES (excluding Alaska) contains approximately eighteen percent of the land area, forty-five percent of the population, and eighty-two percent of the present wealth of the Western Hemisphere. All the rest of the hemisphere, with the exception of the great land-masses to the north of us and a few islands, belongs to what we call Latin America, which has approximately fifty-one percent of the area, fifty-one percent of the population, and ten per cent of the wealth.

Latin America begins right on our borders. The western part of our country is divided from it only by the shallow Rio Grande and a surveyor's line drawn across the desert. In the southeast we are separated from it only by the narrow straits of Florida.

Latin America faces us across the whole of the Gulf of Mexico. The islands of the Caribbean form a barrier thrust eastward into the Atlantic that shuts us off from the South Atlantic and, in this age of airplanes and submarines, threatens our lines of communication with Europe. And our vital economic and military artery, the Panama Canal, is a mere thread stretched through Latin America thirteen hundred miles from New Orleans.

Latin America is now being annexed

by the International Communist Conspiracy through its usual methods of internal subversion, which are largely made possible by the resources of the United States. These resources are placed at the Conspiracy's disposal by the influence of traitors and other criminals that it has planted in our own government. The capture of Latin America is to be the final step in the encirclement of the United States by the Communist Empire. When that step is completed, we shall be, indeed, an overripe fruit that a slight oscillation can shake from its tree.

The Communist conquest proceeds apace, methodically, day by day. If we Americans are not resolved to become as extinct as the Sumerians, we must begin to think clearly and logically about Latin America. As realistically as a general planning a campaign, we must study the territory in which we must operate, and, first of all, we must pick out of a great mass of detail the facts that are strategically essential.

In this article, we shall endeavor to present, as clearly and concisely as possible, some strategic essentials that are not apparent to the average American. We shall take for granted the obvious facts of geography and economics that can be ascertained from any atlas or large almanac.

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CHAPTER ONE *The Problem*

OBVIOUSLY, there are just two *kinds* of action that we *can* take to prevent the whole of Latin America from becoming a province of the sub-human Communist Empire. The first is direct military action: invasion and occupation by American troops. This we *can* do. We are not yet a nation so rotted and enfeebled as our "Liberals" would have us believe. We undoubtedly possess the power to subjugate and administer the *whole* of Latin America, if necessary, though, of course, at considerable cost to ourselves.

If we resolved on such action tomorrow, we could carry it out, even if the International Communist Conspiracy in sheer desperation should dare to attack us militarily from its great territories in Europe and Asia—which is, on the whole, unlikely. We should have to pay for the conquest of Latin America in blood and money—although wise administration might make it a financially profitable investment. But the greatest price would be paid in our own souls. We should have committed ourselves to an imperialism from which there could be no turning back.

A year ago it was still unlikely that we should have to use direct military force anywhere in this hemisphere for sheer self-preservation. A year ago the Communists, whose conquest of Cuba was made possible—as everyone *now* admits—only by the active help and support given them by our own State Department, had not had time to consolidate their power by systematic murder and loot and by the importation of weapons, technicians, and troops from other provinces of the Communist Empire. Now, however, thanks to the

Communist-controlled press and radio that for more than two years constantly injected lies into the minds of the American people and so anesthetized them into unconsciousness of their peril, the Kremlin has thoroughly established itself in Cuba. From this bastion that we helped them build ninety miles from our shores, the enemies of mankind can *now* be dislodged only by external force. And we are the only nation that can apply that force.

In the rest of Latin America, it is just possible that treason and folly have already brought us to the point at which we shall have to use military force in two or three relatively small areas. But there is every reason to believe that we have not yet reached that point anywhere, although we may reach it in the next few months or even weeks. It is clear, however, that the longer we continue to abet and subsidize the Communist Conspiracy in Latin America, the greater the scale of military action that will eventually be necessary.

The *only* alternative to military force is action—diplomatic, economic, and even social—to encourage and strengthen the forces in Latin America that resist the advance of Communism. The first and most important step in such a policy is to stop our government from discouraging, undermining, and bullying the anti-Communists of Latin America. And in all probability even today that would be *all* that we need do in most areas.

The purpose of this article is to exhibit the forces in Latin America that are now on our side or would be on our side if they were given any assurance that they would not encounter rebuff and hostility. And we shall try to

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sketch the background necessary for identification and understanding of those forces. We shall be only incidentally concerned with the operations of the International Communist Conspiracy, and shall not repeat here what was said in our July-September issue, *A WORLD GONE CRAZY*, which contained careful estimates of the extent of Communist control over each Latin-American country on the first of June, 1960.

We strive to reduce the problem to its essentials. That means that we shall have to generalize, to give only a few telling examples to support our generalizations, and to ignore minor exceptions or local variations. That also means that we shall have to be implacably realistic, and shall have no time to soothe with apology the tender sentiments that may be bruised by candor.

CHAPTER TWO *Names*

WE CANNOT REFER TO OUR OWN COUNTRY without being tactless. If we call it the United States, we particularly offend the United States of Brazil. And when we call the citizens of *our* United States the Americans, we are indignantly accused of "Yankee imperialism" by all the inhabitants of Central and South America, who claim that they are just as much entitled to be called Americans as we are. As a matter of fact, they have a better title, for America first appeared as a geographic name on the famous map published by Hylacomylus in 1507, and there designated what is now South America.

But efforts to give ourselves a more distinctive and specific name have failed. Columbia, a name originally bestowed on us in a Latin poem and

once in fairly general use unofficially, now survives only in the name of the District, a patriotic song, and a figure occasionally seen in cartoons. Appalachia, for which there was considerable sentiment in the 1840's, has been completely forgotten. So we remain *the* Americans and our country is America. In terms of imperialism, we are the strongest nation and so have a right to appropriate the name. In terms of socialism, ours is the greatest need: all the other countries are adequately supplied with national names, and should therefore give to us, who are underprivileged in that respect, what is superfluous to them.

We used to call the countries to the south of us Spanish America, but we eventually discovered that the Brazilians speak Portuguese and are proud of it. So now it's Latin America—a most unsatisfactory term. For one thing, a large number of people who live in those countries speak neither Spanish nor Portuguese, and a much larger number have little or no Spanish or Portuguese blood in their veins. For another, the adjective pains Frenchmen and Italians, who contend that they are a lot more Latin than the Spanish and Portuguese, and even more vehemently object to an implied identification of themselves with the assorted inhabitants of Central and South America.

Ibero-American is a much more accurate and specific term, but it inconveniently excludes one independent nation, Haiti, which has been ruled, since the systematic massacre of the whites in 1804, by an aristocracy of mulattoes who speak French. So, after all, Latin America is the only available name, and it will have to do.

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CHAPTER THREE *The Great Difference*

EVERYONE who has spent more than fifteen minutes in any part of Latin America knows that that part of the world differs *fundamentally* from the United States. But although our tourists have learned not to complain of the differences, most of us, in a very large part of our thinking, go right on expecting almost any given country south of us to behave as though it were the United States. And when it does not, we feel aggrieved—and, if we have been listening to the caterwauling of our "Liberals," think we ought to tax ourselves to pay the Latin Americans to behave better.

Although the various countries of Latin America differ from one another, and there are some great contrasts, they seem virtually identical when one considers how greatly and radically they differ from the United States in both history and present status—economic, political, and social.

The Latin Americans simply have not accomplished what we have accomplished. They are more numerous than we. Their natural resources, both agricultural and mineral, are far greater than ours. Here and there one finds climatic extremes not matched in the United States, but their climate on the whole is at least as favorable. Historically they got a head start on us: when the Pilgrims landed on our "stern and rock-bound coast," there were large and prosperous cities in Latin America, and the university in Lima, for example, had been in operation for the better part of a century.

The fundamental difference, therefore, must lie in the people. If we do not get a clear perception of the na-

ture of that difference and what it entails, we can speak endlessly of Latin America and never know what we are talking about.

CHAPTER FOUR *The People*

THE POPULATIONS of all Latin-American countries are formed, in widely differing proportions, of three basic stocks: Indians, Europeans from Spain or Portugal, and Negroes, originally imported as slaves. In a few areas there has been an immigration of white men from other European countries, of Chinese, or of Hindus sufficiently large to be locally significant.

I

The Indians of the Western Hemisphere form a distinct race, which, however, shows so many similarities to the Mongolian that it is generally thought to have come to the New World from Asia at a very early time, presumably across the Bering Straits and presumably in a series of successive migrations. This race, however, is divided into a very large number of ethnic groups clearly distinguished from one another by secondary physical characteristics as well as tribal habits. The linguistic variety, indeed, is remarkable and thus far unexplained: the almost innumerable languages spoken in the Western Hemisphere were all primitive in range of expression, but they included all of the four basic *kinds* of language: inflective, analytic, agglutinative, and holophrastic.

We generalize fairly from a vast mass of detail when we say that, with the exception of the civilizations that we shall mention presently, there were no natives of the Western Hemisphere

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who could be regarded as superior, by any standard, to the natives of what is now the United States — the Iroquois, for example, or the Sioux. These had many admirable qualities: they were brave and, on occasion, stoical, and they were content with the simple amusements of hunting and tribal warfare. They did not, however, in the least correspond to the pictures devised by Rousseau and other Romantic *littérateurs*, who had never seen an Indian, but reasoned that anyone who was not civilized must be an incarnation of all the virtues that high civilization proposes to itself as ideals. The point is worth mentioning for a generation or two ago our sentimental schoolgirls blubbered over Chateaubriand's *Atala* and *Les Natchez*, and the present generation of addled eggheads is blubbering over what the sentimental schoolgirls eventually told their children.

Many of the natives of the Western Hemisphere were very far below the level of the Iroquois or the Sioux; some of them, indeed, almost matched in savagery and ferocity the newer members of the "United Nations." We must remember that the Caribs, for example, not only gave their name to the Caribbean but also supplied us (via Spanish) with the word 'cannibal.' The survivors of equally unprepossessing peoples are still to be found in many regions.

Latin America had two civilizations, in the Spenglerian sense of that word; that we should carefully notice, both as indications of what is native to those regions and because they are now being revived as very potent political forces.

Whether these civilizations were really indigenous to the Western Hemisphere or were the results of cultures

brought to this hemisphere long before the time of Columbus by immigrants from Asia and Europe is a question of the utmost importance in anthropology, but one to which there is as yet no definite answer. If there were colonists, as seems a little the more probable, they must have been sufficiently numerous to establish themselves and their arts before they were racially absorbed in the aborigines. At all events, the two civilizations had for some centuries existed in isolation from the rest of the world and from one another at the time that the Spanish *conquistadores* came upon them.

The more remarkable and interesting of the two flourished along the western coast of South America in what is now Peru, Ecuador, and the northern part of Chile. It provides one of the most noteworthy and instructive chapters in the history of mankind.

Although these peoples formed a civilization in the Spenglerian sense, they lacked many of the essentials of civilization in the sense in which that word is more commonly used to indicate relative position, on a scale that runs from utter savagery through barbarism to high civilization. On that scale, the subjects of the Inca had a cultural status intermediate between barbarism and the beginning of civilization. They had a culture approximately equal to that of Egypt at the very opening of its history under the First Dynasty (c. 3100 B.C.); and there are many curious parallels between the two.

The subjects of the Inca had no system of coinage or commerce, no writing or literature, no capacity for reflective thought, and, so far as we can tell, they gave no promise of ever attaining

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these fundamentals of higher culture. But they possessed a well developed agriculture, skill in the construction of permanent buildings, artistry in weaving, ceramics, and goldwork, and a system of bookkeeping (by means of coded threads, the *quipu*). They irrigated some of their land, raised llamas (a hybrid which, although not sterile, had to be bred artificially), and built temples and palaces, of which the ruins now properly excite the admiration of tourists and the zeal of archaeologists.

These peoples, of course, had advanced beyond the classless society, which is found only among the lowest savages, but they remained on the relatively low level of socialism, and they never attained the concept of private property and individualism. All land was communal; production was organized for use instead of profit; and the entire economy was planned to the last detail by a thoroughly centralized government, and managed by an elaborate bureaucracy which had 1,331 administrators for every ten thousand citizens. Everyone was counselled and supervised from the cradle to the grave; even his "leisure" was minutely regimented; and the Welfare State effectively prevented (as all welfare states must) the development of individual intelligence and initiative. The society was the perfect model of Socialism.

Socialism was accompanied by frank expression of the political concept toward which all centralized governments tend, and which they express as openly as the mental and spiritual degradation of their subjects permits. All planned societies *must* be based on the notion that the planners are superior beings who know what is best for everyone, and that they have a right

to make everyone do what "is best for society." This, in turn, means that the bureaucracy *must* have as its chief a superhuman despot from whose superhuman authority it derives its powers. When the bureaucracy has to take over a society that has already attained a measure of freedom, it finds it expedient at first to represent its chief as a man who is, in some peculiar and mysterious way, an incarnation of the "will of the people," but that formula merely serves to ease the transition to the clearer statement that the chief is an incarnation of divinity itself.

The early stages in the development of that concept were recently seen in the mystical and quasi-religious veneration that was accorded such creatures as Adolf Hitler and Franklin Roosevelt; its evolution may be traced step by step in the Roman Empire, from Augustus, who claimed to be merely the leading citizen (*princeps civium*), to Diocletian, who frankly proclaimed that he was Lord and God (*dominus et deus*), although there still were Romans too intelligent to believe it. The complete formulation of the concept, however, may most clearly be seen in Egypt and Peru.

The Inca was the exact counterpart of the Egyptian Pharaoh: he was by definition God on earth; he was the divine Son of the Sun; and he therefore owned everything in the land he ruled—all the soil, all the buildings, and all the livestock, whether quadruped or biped. Under his all-seeing and paternalistic eye, his docile and bovine subjects lived, worked, and died as livestock on a huge plantation, and, like livestock, they were thoughtless and content, never questioning the authority of their trainers and herdsmen,

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the bureaucracy that carried out the Divine Will.

The political concept was logically applied. When, for example, the immortal Inca deigned to return to his father, the Sun, his body was carefully embalmed and, as in pre-dynastic Egypt, his concubines and personal attendants were strangled to accompany him, thus gaining an assurance of immortality denied to less fortunate subjects. Whenever it was desired to remind the Sun of a need for rain or some other favor, Indians and llamas were slain as sacrifices, but the valuable animals were, on the whole, used sparingly for such purposes. The Incas were the only great power in their world and so had nothing to fear from war, but they gradually extended their boundaries to exercise their warriors and, doubtless, to bring the blessings of economic planning to the "underdeveloped" areas around them. They did not slaughter their captives; they just put them to work.

It must be emphasized that the régime *did* ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The Incas were more successful than the Pharaohs—certainly because they were geographically isolated, probably also because there was no writing, and quite possibly because racial differences were in their favor. There is absolutely no indication of even the slightest dissatisfaction with their rule. Their subjects had complete social security and nothing to worry about. It was a land of contented people. This state of contentment may have been augmented to some extent by the habit of chewing coca leaves, which contain cocaine; and by endemic syphilis, for which the race had a tolerance much greater than that

of white men, so that the disease produced stolidity rather than paresis, and did not seriously decrease fecundity. The subjects of the Incas were probably as happy as human beings have ever been on this earth; certainly no nation known to history surpassed them, even momentarily, in collective satisfaction and content with their political and economic life.

The culture of Central America was generally similar to that of Peru, but there were also very important differences. For one thing, it was much older and had a long history, parts of which are sketchily known, before the Aztecs rose to power. The Mayas, indeed, had in their calculiform hieroglyphs a system of writing potentially as useful as the Egyptian, although the Aztecs, significantly, used only *pinturas*, small drawings which served as mnemonic devices, not as writing. The Mayas also had an excellent vigesimal arithmetic, a chronology, and an extraordinarily accurate calendar to reconcile the lunar and solar years.

In Mexico we find approximately the same degree of skill in architecture and city-building that we find in Peru, about the same degree of artistry in textiles, ceramics, and goldwork, and an agriculture that was less advanced, with no domesticated animal comparable to the llama. We find the same endemic syphilis, but no coca. And, most important, the inhabitants had not been thoroughly domesticated. Land was owned communally, but by tribes and clans, not by a central government. There was an extensive, if primitive, commerce. Men could trade their own goods and had considerable personal freedom, because there was no bureaucracy at all comparable to that

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which administered the welfare state in Peru.

The Aztec Empire, unlike the Peruvian, was in theory a federation of tribes, although the other members were in fact strictly subordinated to the Aztec emperor in the great city of Mexico-Tenochtitlán. So long as his orders and requisitions were obeyed without question, local chiefs and even the heads of clans could do pretty much as they wished.

The salient and most efficiently administered aspect of Aztec government was its policy of Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, which was much neater than anything thus far devised in Washington.

The prosperity of the empire depended on the favor of the numerous gods. This favor could be obtained only by the regular and methodical sacrifice of human beings—men, women, or children, according to the etiquette appropriate to the particular deity and occasion. And although you could use homefolks in an emergency, the only really acceptable sacrifices were captives taken in battle or raids. It was therefore necessary to have at least one good war going on *all* the time to provide a steady stream of captives flowing to the perpetually smoking *teocallis*, the pyramidal temples that formed the skyline of every city. According to the best estimates, the *teocallis* of Tenochtitlán alone (i.e. excluding suburbs) required a minimum budget of twenty thousand human beings per annum for routine operations. (The budget went up, of course, in times of national emergency.) A wise administration, therefore, understood that a decisive victory would be a poor substitute for continued warfare, and tried to keep sev-

eral limited wars going simultaneously to guard against possible interruption of this vital public service.

Most of the sacrifices called for some scientific skill. Although for special purposes a victim might be killed in various ways, such as by building a small fire on his or her chest, the routine procedure was standardized. The priest, using an obsidian knife, made an incision in the breast of the living victim so as to lay bare the heart without damaging it. Then with his bare hands he tore out the heart with such dexterity and despatch that the heart was still beating as he held it up to the Sun or threw it at the foot of an idol. It is said that considerable surgical skill is required to perform this operation without bungling.

The Aztecs had a culture far superior to that of most African tribes today, and were not instinctively cannibals. A warrior, however, often took pleasure in retrieving from the *teocalli* the body of a victim whom he had personally captured, and in serving selected cuts, well broiled and garnished, to his friends at a ceremonial dinner. Often also the victims were carefully flayed and their skins preserved entire for use in masquerades. This was one society in which a man could not only get under a woman's skin, but in it, and the hides of females were especially prized for wear on sportive occasions.

The societies that we have sketched are not mere items of antiquarian or anthropological interest. In the regions in which they flourished, the most powerful single idea today is the doctrine that these were great and noble civilizations, wrongfully and shamefully destroyed by the bigoted and *culturally inferior* Christians. Motion

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pictures, for example, are being produced to contrast the nobility, generosity, and refinement of the Indian with the brutality, treachery, and grossness of the Spaniard. And the influence of this doctrine is felt, in varying ways, throughout all of Latin America.

II

It is customary to disparage and denigrate the *conquistadores*. A well-trained "Liberal" automatically dismisses with a sneer the courage and resolution that enabled mere handfuls of men to subdue teeming populations by whom they were fantastically, hopelessly outnumbered; but he can scarcely travel by train or automobile from Laredo to Mexico City, or from Guayaquil to Quito, or over some other route now commonplace, without seeing in his mind's eye a small file of men marching steadfastly across the endless and forsaken desert or seeking a precarious way amid the abrupt and stupendous mountains — a tiny band plodding through the Enormous toward the Unknown — a few men, alone and lost in a vast, alien, and hostile world: lost, indeed, but for their indomitable will. I have heard that vision tear from the most reluctant lips the exclamation, "By God, they were MEN!"

The Spanish brought with them, as conquerors and colonists, the culture of Spain in her great centuries, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth. This culture, which shaped the colonies in the New World and left an indelible impress on the nations formed from them, was subtle and complex, and we cannot undertake to describe it here.

It is a culture that peculiarly lends itself to misrepresentation by scholars

grinding theses and by propagandists grinding axes. We can only enter a general *caveat* against all facile simplifications, and cursorily notice two of them, which will shed some light on Spanish America.

Since the publication in 1927 of a book by a German named Wantoch, it has been customary in some circles to say that Spain was a part of Europe to which the Renaissance did not penetrate, so that the country remained "Mediaeval." But look at the facts. The real motive force of the Renaissance was the great admiration for Classical antiquity that we call Humanism, and one of the essentials of Humanistic discipline was the writing of Classical (not Mediaeval) Latin. The first literary work written and printed in Mexico was a series of Latin dialogues modelled on the *Colloquia* of Erasmus. The national poet of Guatemala is Rafael de Landívar, whose charming *Rusticatio Mexicana* has often been reprinted in Europe and even in the United States. The tradition never entirely died out. The foremost literary man of Colombia, in whose honor that country's learned academy is named, was the Latin poet, Miguel Antonio Caro (1843-1909), who, incidentally, also served a term as Vice President of the nation. These are but examples; they remind us in passing that we have no occasion to look down on Latin America's accomplishment in the kind of study that our oldest universities were founded to promote.

Professor Américo Castro of Princeton brought out in 1948 a book of more than seven hundred pages entitled *España en su Historia*, in which much learning is used to support the thesis that there was no Spanish culture be-

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fore the Moslem conquest and that that culture was forever fixed in all its essentials by the year 1000, before the Christian reconquest really began. All this seems inexplicable until one notes that it provides an opportunity to make "Liberals" purr by catering to their racial fanaticism. It is quite easy to show that parts of the Spanish traditions go back even to pre-Roman times, but the point that interests us here is that Spanish culture was profoundly modified during the colonial period and partly as a result of the conquest of the New World.

One cause of the change, to be sure, was the Counter Reformation, which has been the subject of endless polemic, but few people take into account the really traumatic effect of the discovery, forced on intelligent Spaniards gradually by the crucial events of a half century, that Spain, although unquestionably the greatest, richest, and most powerful nation in the world, was somehow decadent. She was the greatest naval power, and the Armada had been the greatest naval fiasco of modern history. She had the best armies in the world and almost invariably won battles, but lost wars. Gold and silver flowed across the Atlantic from the mines of the New World, and the result was ever increasing taxation and creeping economic paralysis. A nation so filled with able-bodied beggars, vagabonds, and adventurers that it seemed overpopulated had to import foreigners to work in its fields and industries. The thirty-two universities of Spain were overrun by hordes of students—there are said to have been twelve thousand at Alcalá alone, which was reputed to have the highest standards of all—but the intellectual level of the nation was

visibly falling. The expansion of education was producing only swarms of *letrados* who flew straight from the college doors into the hives of bureaucracy, and swarms of semi-educated proletarians who starved and stole because they could find no positions commensurate with their expectations. Everywhere that one looked in the world's richest and most powerful nation there were signs of decay, visible at first only to thoughtful observers, apparent to everyone after Portugal successfully revolted in 1640.

Thus Spain came to doubt herself and to meditate anxiously on the nature of her own culture. In a sense this questioning is still going on in innumerable books written in Spain and Latin America—all in the mood of what one of the most distinguished and judicious of contemporary scholars, Antonio Tovar, calls "national introspection."

The important point for our present purposes is that this growing awareness of decadence produced an intense intellectual effort on all levels in the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries. There were innumerable analyses of what was wrong and plans of what could be done to correct it. There were thousands of these plans (*arbitrios*) and they range from the most realistic thinking (as in the work that we had occasion to mention, April, 1960, p. 34) to muddle-headedness worthy of a Washington bureaucrat, as in the discovery that what Spain needed was a new source of revenue—so why not levy a tax on each tile in the roofs of houses? The variety of these plans is almost infinite. Álvaro Osorio y Redim, for example, had the basically socialist idea that the profits of all the middlemen who stand between producer and

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final consumer are "economic waste" and therefore the cause of high prices. Luis de Castilla worked out a plan (on which the Cortes of 1604 held long hearings) for abolishing the sales-tax and increasing the production of food by forcing everyone to work for the government twenty days out of each year — a proposal moderate when compared to our income tax. One could name a hundred others.

Now no one has read all of these plans—thousands remain buried in the archives to which they were consigned three centuries ago — but all that are known to me have just *one* thing in common. The nation's salvation may lie in charging toll of all ships passing the Straits of Gibraltar, or in reducing the revenues of the Church, or replacing mules with oxen on the farms, but *whatever* it is, it is to be accomplished by a *decree from the central government*.

Spain did not have a fully centralized government, because her kings were not in fact absolute monarchs. Their power was limited by a very large number of special rights held by towns, guilds, and other local organizations, and by ancient laws; each province had its own *cortes* with which the kings had to negotiate to obtain taxes, and which possessed very considerable authority in other matters. But the most active minds of Spain could see in her growing difficulties only a need for *more and more centralized government*.

That premise was the basis of all proposals on the practical level, and political theory conformed to it, moving always toward absolute monarchy. A Juan de Mariana could argue that people had inherent rights which they

could not alienate to a king or anyone else, but his brilliant young friend, Quevedo, "progressed" to the theory of absolutism, and could suggest only that "a good king must be loved, a bad one, endured." This, because any other view would limit the power of central government to perform its duty to regulate all aspects of national life.

This thinking was part of the cultural heritage of Latin America; it is one reason why the development of political and economic institutions there could never, under any circumstances, have paralleled that of the colonies that became the United States. The notion that a central government should regulate the economy, which has been foisted on us in recent years by alien or alienated minds, came to Latin America as part of its heritage.

III

The Negroes imported into Latin America call for no extended comment. They came, of course, from every part of Africa open to the slave trade and therefore represented a wide variety of racial stocks.

It should be noted, however, that wherever they were imported in large numbers, as in the islands of the Caribbean, they largely or entirely replaced the original Indian population.

It should also be noted that, *on the whole*, Negroes in Latin America have never enjoyed the advantages that they enjoyed in the United States. Their level of civilization is therefore much lower, and the superstitions of the jungle have often resisted and counteracted the influence of Christianity. Voodoo, to be sure, is not unknown in the United States, but almost six hundred pages are required to outline the

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persistence of savage beliefs in R. Bastide's recently published *Les religions africaines au Brésil*.

IV

There are, of course, other cultural influences and other ethnic groups. The Portuguese culture of Brazil differs in several respects from the Spanish. Argentina has received a very large number of immigrants, especially from Italy and Germany. Prominent individuals of non-Spanish origin have appeared everywhere: Ambrose O'Higgins was Viceroy of Peru under the Spanish Empire, and his son, often compared to George Washington, led the revolution for independence in Chile and became the first dictator of that country. And there are many local oddities, such as Curaçao, a Dutch possession in which the most common language is Papiamentu, a grotesque mixture of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and some English with various Indian and African dialects.

CHAPTER FIVE *The Colonies*

THERE ARE TWO IMPORTANT POINTS to be noticed under this heading: the Spanish method of colonization differed radically from our own, and the administration of colonies differed almost as markedly. The causes were multiple, and the details are almost infinite; we limit ourselves to the fundamental contrasts which were decisive for the future that has now become the present.

Colonization in our country was essentially a process of driving the Indians out of one region after another—eventually into reservations—and of occupying the territory thus vacated by establishing homogeneous white settle-

ments. Racial mixture was negligible. The systematic expulsion of the aborigines is often deplored. But it is one reason why the United States is a great nation and a world power.

The Spanish started from the premise that Indians differed from themselves only in religion and education. Two years after Cortes occupied Tenochtitlán, the Franciscans had opened their first school, trying to give to Indian children the same kind of education that was given in Spain to Spanish children. To the work of conversion and education Spain devoted vast sums of money, patience unwearied by innumerable disappointments, and the whole lives of many thousands of dedicated ecclesiastics. Intermixture was inevitable where there were few or no Spanish women, but inter-marriage was often officially encouraged as a matter of policy. Children took rank from their father, and many *mestizos* (e.g. the famous Garcilaso de la Vega) early became prominent and distinguished. But the Spanish also recognized the native aristocracy, although the fact is often concealed from modern readers by the imposition of Christian baptismal names: few would recognize full-blooded Indians in Don Fernando de Alva Cortés or Don Hernando de Alvarado!

The Spanish operated on the theory that they had come to civilize and govern already populated states in which the bulk of the population would always be Indians. In Mexico and Peru, of course, they took over already settled territory, but even in regions inhabited by nomadic groups the procedure was to establish a *reducción*, settling the natives in a town and as many villages as seemed desirable. The

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fullest application of this principle was the all-native "republic" that the Jesuits established in what was then Paraguay, from which they attempted to exclude all white settlers or traders, and which they tried to make into a kind of Platonic state of which they would be the Guardians. Their hope to make this state a "model province" of the Spanish Empire was not in conflict with the theory of colonialism, and had not the territory been ceded to Portugal, the Jesuits would not have attempted a revolt with the native troops whom they had drilled so thoroughly that they were able for a little while to hold off both the Portuguese and the Spanish armies.

This concept of Spain's function in the New World had four important consequences. It meant, first of all, that there was *no room* in the Spanish colonies for the kind of people who formed the real bulk and strength of the English colonies — the people who came to work with their own hands on the plow or at the forge and to perform all the necessary tasks that in the Spanish colonies gave employment to the natives. Second, it left great expanses of territory virtually without white settlers; there was no frontier in the American sense to which a man could go to make with his own hands a home in the wilderness. Third, it created a large population of *mestizos*, who were, for the most part, unhappy souls condemned to a kind of No Man's Land between two cultures, to both of which they were temperamentally and spiritually alien, and between which the conflicts became more acute with the passage of centuries. And finally, a large proportion of the Spaniards who came to the New World came, not to

establish homes, but to serve in administrative posts or advance themselves in other ways for a few years and then return home.

The great conquests were effected by private adventurers who financed and staffed their own expeditions. But as soon as territory had been won, the Spanish government, in the phrase plausibly but incorrectly attributed to Cortes, "hastened to reap where it had not sown."

Title to land was obtained by grant from the crown, and most of the grants, at least in theory, were revocable at pleasure; some were revoked when policies were changed. And the crown always reserved to itself all minerals (including, by a remarkable anticipation, oil), leasing these for exploitation, usually on a percentage basis and with rights to conscript labor that were at variance with its general policy toward the Indians.

All of Spanish America was administered from Spain, politically by the Council of the Indies, and economically by the Casa de Contratación. The two bureaucracies were often at cross purposes until the first finally gained supremacy over the second. The great distances made it necessary to grant considerable, though sometimes not clearly defined and often overlapping, powers to viceroys, captains general, and *audiencias*. All of these held office by royal appointment for a stated period of years, and all important officials were normally sent from Spain for their tour of duty and expected to return at the conclusion thereof.

This bureaucracy functioned, on the whole, about as well as bureaucracies ever do. It naturally knew what was best for everybody and tried to make

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everybody do it. It decided when and where more hemp should be grown or fewer grapes should be harvested or tariffs should be changed. Like all economic planners, it was normally stupid and often idiotic. (We may, for example, classify attempts to prevent the colonies from exchanging their own products as ordinary policy in the paper world in which bureaucracies live, while prohibition of navigation on an Argentine river for the purpose of protecting the carrying trade across the Isthmus of Panama belongs to the sublimer realm of sheer lunacy.) At its worst, however, the Spanish bureaucracy never reached the low level of our parasites in Washington, who, for example, subsidize the importation of agricultural products for the purpose of creating a surplus to force American farmers to accept subsidies and eventual serfdom. We are in no position to look down on the Spanish colonial administration: it was only *ordinarily* fatuous and corrupt, and if it sapped and blighted everything that it touched, it did so naturally and without malice.

The result of this administration, however, was that the Spanish colonies had absolutely nothing that was even remotely comparable to the organs of self-government that the English colonies had from their inception, or speedily acquired. What was equally serious and a far greater cause of discontent was that the permanent white residents, whether creoles or Spaniards who had managed to obtain from the bureaucracy permission to migrate to the New World, had no status as such *vis-à-vis* the officers sent in by the central government. Permanent residence normally disqualified men for all save the most minor places in the bureauc-

racy, it being assumed that a colonial would favor local interests and, perhaps, be unfair to the aborigines. Although, of course, they fared better and many of them were wealthy, the colonial residents were legally as much subjects of the Council of the Indies as the Indians, and sometimes complained hyperbolically that they did not enjoy as much consideration and protection.

It would have been absurd to expect to find in the colonies any capacity for, or real understanding of, self-government.

CHAPTER SIX *Independence*

WE LIKE TO TELL OURSELVES that our example "lit the torch of Liberty" for Latin America. That is mostly fantasy.

As a matter of fact, the Spanish colonial administration greatly improved during the second half of the Eighteenth Century; removal of the worst restrictions on trade promoted an unprecedented prosperity; and some historians flatly conclude that Latin America has never since been so well governed as it was at that time. If we take the area as a whole, that is probably true.

There was very little sentiment for independence anywhere. The Brazilian youngster who spouted ideals to Thomas Jefferson in France in 1787, the tall tales of Francisco de Miranda, and a pamphlet or two written by anonymous "patriots" who were really exiled and embittered Jesuits in Europe, are not evidence of anything more significant than the petulance of a very few individuals.

The real author of independence in Latin America was Napoleon, who first forced Prince John to transfer the royal government of Portugal to Brazil, and

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then made the colossal blunder, which eventually ruined him, of installing his own brother, Joseph, as King of Spain. A few officials in Spanish America tried to straddle the fence, but the colonies would have nothing of Joseph. They professed allegiance to Charles IV, who had abdicated and then tried to unabdicate, or to his successor, Ferdinand VII, whom Napoleon had deposed and held prisoner, or to the Junta that was leading the revolt against France in Spain; and many people worked secretly on behalf of Carlota Joaquina, the daughter of Charles IV, who had ambitions of her own. The important fact, however, was that the Spanish colonial administration had become a decapitated chicken. With no Ministry of the Indies to receive reports and send instructions, the bureaucracy in the various colonies continued to run only by blind reflexes. This, more than any other single factor, encouraged various movements for independence.

These movements did not immediately collapse with the restoration of Ferdinand in 1814, but by 1816 it appeared highly probable that Spanish rule would be restored throughout Spanish America, as it had already been restored in most of it.

It was a second wave of revolution that made the Spanish colonies (except the islands) independent. There were various contributing factors: Ferdinand's incompetence and his conspicuous lack of personal dignity and honor; the revolution of 1820 in Spain and the counter-revolution which followed; colonial dissatisfaction with the Spanish mercantile system and its restrictions on both exports and imports; the declaration of independence by the

United Provinces of La Plata (now Argentina) and their bold expedient of invading Chile; the discreet intrigues of Canning, who, since two small English expeditions had been unable to hold Argentina, was determined to weaken the Holy Alliance by diminishing the Spanish Empire, while simultaneously opening a way for a gradual extension of English influence that might end in eventual control—a way that Monroe adroitly closed with the Monroe Doctrine.

The successful revolutions were all revolutions of creoles against European domination. Their primary goal was to replace the viceroy or captain general of their province with a government that could make final decisions on the spot, promptly, and in the interests of the province, without regard for the interests of the mother country or of the other provinces. That is why the nations of Spanish America today correspond to the administrative divisions of the Spanish Empire.

Independence, however, meant that the colony lost the stabilizing force of an outside authority that could peremptorily adjudicate conflicts of interest *within* the province. It also meant that the creoles would somehow have to select one of themselves to replace the Spaniard who had held the position that gave social superiority over all creoles — an extremely delicate question among proud and jealous men. And finally, the King, of course, could recall a captain general at pleasure, but who could recall, in the event of incompetence or usurpation, the man whom the creoles selected to replace the captain general? The best minds among the creoles foresaw these difficulties and made a real effort to avert

them.

We must remember, if we are ever to understand Latin America, that in the newly independent nations our form of government was *universally rejected*.

The two great Liberators, José de San Martín and Simón de Bolívar, were both men of ardent and high ideals. Both came from excellent families of northern Spanish origin, were well educated and highly intelligent, and exhibited such military and political genius that it is highly doubtful whether Spanish America could have become independent without them. Both admired the United States — and judged its institutions inapplicable to their own countries.

San Martín roundly declared that a constitution like that of the United States would make his country, which is now Argentina, "a den of beasts," and heartily approved of the establishment of a constitutional monarchy of which Prince Charles Louis, Duke of Lucca, would be invited to become king with quite extensive powers. After his victorious campaign in Chile and Peru, he projected the establishment of what he evidently intended to be an absolute monarchy of which he hoped to induce a prince of the royal house of England to become king. But O'Higgins, whom he had left in charge in Chile, was by no means willing to step down as dictator of that country, and Bolívar was vehemently opposed to the importation of a monarch from Europe. San Martín, who was perfectly disinterested and therefore unwilling to precipitate civil war, resigned his position and withdrew to voluntary exile in France.

Bolívar was equally emphatic in re-

jecting our federal constitution as a model: "the people of the United States are unique in the history of the human race . . . The idea never entered my head to consider as identical the characteristics of two peoples so different as the Anglo-American and the Spanish-American." The constitution which he drew for his own country (what is now Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador) provided for a completely centralized government: a Congress consisting of a House elected by fairly wide suffrage and an *hereditary* Senate; a President elected by the Congress but with powers approximating those then possessed by the King of England; an independent judiciary; and to these was to be added a fourth branch of government, an "Areopagus" of forty-one members to have *complete* authority over education, manners, and morals, with the power to rebuke and to punish with infamy persons guilty of corruption or immorality in either public or private life.

This was Bolívar at his most optimistic. In the constitution which he subsequently drew for Bolivia he made some changes: the franchise was restricted with devices to prevent the direct election of anyone; the Senate became elective with eight-year terms, but Bolívar got in his "Areopagus" as a House of Censors holding office for life and charged with the further duty of preventing unconstitutional action by other branches of government; and the executive was elected by Congress for life.

But Bolívar learned from experience that it is one thing to draw constitutions and another thing to persuade men to observe them. In Bolivia, Sucre, a disinterested man of the highest

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principles, came to the conclusion that only an executive with virtually dictatorial powers could run that country, and, his arm shattered in a mutiny of his own guards, resigned in disgust. At home Bolívar fared but little better; the Constitution of 1821 broke down in 1826, although he was able to keep it going a little longer by exerting his personal prestige. He eventually came around to the opinion of San Martín that he had once so vehemently opposed. He tried to negotiate for the establishment of a monarchy under British protection and with a king chosen by England, but the British government either mistrusted Bolívar or kept its eye on the Monroe Doctrine.

Bolívar had reason for concern. His Vice President, eager to rise and shine, arranged a nocturnal assassination from which the Liberator escaped only by crawling out of a back window while one of his mistresses delayed the conspirators. Various generals attempted revolts, and one finally succeeded in establishing himself in Venezuela. Bolívar resigned in disgust, declaring "we have acquired independence at the expense of everything else." And after the assassination of his close and loyal friend, Sucre, he bitterly concluded that all men who had fought for independence had merely "plowed the sea," and regretted his part in such folly.

Such was the uniform experience of Latin America. Constitutions merely incited the very people who should have defended them to circumvent or supersede them. Stability had to be obtained by other means.

Paraguay became independent under Dr. Rodríguez Francia, who paid no attention to parliamentary trappings. He simply gave Paraguay the govern-

ment that it wanted and needed, ruling as a benevolent, though on occasion relentless, despot. Absolute power is more than any man can bear without being corrupted by it, but we should not think of the good Doctor of Theology and his supporters as evil men. He was, so to speak, a Spanish captain general who did not have to worry about a government in Madrid or a local bureaucracy sent by that government to watch and check him. He decided everything, and that was that.

By far the longest period of stability was enjoyed by Brazil, which became independent as an Empire under the son of the King of Portugal. The Empire lasted until 1889, and might have lasted much longer, had not Pedro II's daughter, who acted as Regent while he was travelling in Europe, tried to distinguish herself as a great Humanitarian. But for the Empire, Brazil would probably have become several countries corresponding to the colonial administrative divisions, and each of these would have had the same record of internal turmoil that distinguishes other Latin-American countries.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Revolutions

WE CANNOT EVEN adumbrate here the chaotic history of the nations of Latin America. Bolivia's most prominent historian has calculated that during the first century of her history she had one hundred and ninety revolutions, successful and unsuccessful, and it may be that that record is unsurpassed. A very concise account of the more important revolutions and wars down to about 1940 may be found in the third edition of William Spence Robertson's *History of the Latin-American Nations* (New

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York, 1943); a fuller account, in the fourteen volumes of the *Historia de América* edited by Ricardo Levene (Buenos Aires, 1940-41).

The reader will find that under the rhetoric and the superficial variety of all these movements, if we exclude banditry on a national scale, such as was frequent in Mexico, and the really subversive forces of recent years, there is a basic uniformity. The exact provisions of the constitutions that are perennially promulgated, revised, suspended, and replaced usually mean little, and it does not greatly matter whether presidents are replaced by juntas, or juntas are replaced by dictators. Most of the almost innumerable "revolutions" in Latin America since independence had one simple result: they changed the captain general. Under the constitutional overlay the outlines of colonial government can be seen almost as clearly as the old administrative divisions are shown by the boundaries of the modern states.

It is not our purpose to comment on this type of revolution. We limit ourselves to five observations that we think Americans should keep in mind when considering the variegated history of Latin America.

First, Bolívar was certainly an idealist in his youth, but never did it enter into his head "to consider as identical the characteristics of two peoples so different." We must be equally rational.*

* The reader who wishes to explore these differences for himself could take as his point of departure the efforts of Latin Americans to explain their own political instability, beginning with Antonio Grompone, *Filosofía de las revoluciones* (Buenos Aires, 1932), and Alfredo Colmo, *La revolución en la América latina* (2a ed., Buenos Aires, 1933). Both books should be read critically and in the light of events subsequent to their publication, which will pro-

vide a certain perspective. The most objective and discerning study of the causes of political instability was written in 1911 by Francisco García Calderón, and is fortunately available in an English translation, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress* (London, 1913). We shall have occasion to mention this work in another connection in Chapter 14, *infra*.

Second, the uniform experience of mankind shows that, whatever the people and their characteristics, a centralized government which undertakes to supervise the nation's economy necessarily evolves toward dictatorship or some other form of autocracy, which is the only satisfactory solution of the clash of interests aroused by economic intervention, and is the only possible solution in an economic crisis.

Third, we in the United States are in no position to criticize others for political ineptitude, or feel superior to them on that score. We, who started with advantages that no other nation ever enjoyed, have permitted our very Constitution to be subverted by a gang of revolutionaries lodged in our Supreme Court, and our whole political structure to be subverted by a gang of criminals that admittedly operates on the formula, "tax to spend to elect to tax to spend to elect."

Fourth, the Camayura in the Amazon basin have a periodic ceremony called *tanga-tanga* in which all the citizens gallop around the village from sunrise to sunset: they believe that this makes big medicine. Persistent driveling about "democracy" has led a great many Americans to believe that big medicine is made whenever a large number of people, however ignorant, stupid, or barbarous, drop marbles or toy figurines or marked slips of paper in a box. This quaint superstition really has nothing to do with the fact that

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the best means of controlling governments is through votes cast by an electorate sufficiently informed, intelligent, and responsible that it cannot be befuddled by the yammering, or corrupted by the bribes, of demagogues. Where such an electorate does not exist, tribal magic performed with ballot-boxes is certain to be inefficacious and very likely to be pernicious. What "Liberals" mean when they clamor for "democratic elections" everywhere is obvious from their conviction that the need for this potent magic ceases as soon as the International Communist Conspiracy has annexed the area in question.

Fifth, our moral right to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of any other country is limited to (a) our obvious interest in the existence of stable governments that will respect their obligations to the United States and its citizens, and (b) the military necessity of preventing our implacable enemies from occupying territory that is strategically important to us.

CHAPTER EIGHT *Present Contrasts*

THE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA present great contrasts — in size, climate, topography, agriculture, degree of urbanization and industrialization, relative economic and financial stability, and even formal political organization. The interests of the various states are seldom the same, and are very frequently in conflict. These differences are very important and must be considered very carefully in formulating a policy toward any given state. What is remarkable is that states so different should show so many similarities.

One of the most fundamental dif-

ferences, frequently overlooked in the United States, is in composition of population. Argentina, soon after she freed herself from the restraints of Spanish colonial administration, embarked on a series of internal military operations which virtually eliminated the aborigines. Uruguay did likewise. Neither state is culturally homogeneous — to the racial differences among the Spanish themselves must be added the effects of very extensive immigration from Italy, Germany, and other European countries — but the internal differences are relatively inconspicuous. All the other nations have an acute racial diversity that, except in a few areas, has thus far been partly concealed by the social, economic, and political preponderance of prominent families, by the persistence of the old notions on which the Spanish colonial system was based, and by the unchallenged authority of the Church, which provided a common faith. (Mexico is the obvious exception.) In many countries, however, this diversity is certain to cause increasingly open and acute conflict in the future — if for no other reason, because it provides an obvious point of attack for the International Communist Conspiracy, which always creates and exploits racial tensions as the most effective single means of paralyzing a nation. How effective a means it is may be seen from the record in Guatemala and Bolivia, and from current subversion in various countries, especially Peru.

We have compiled the following table to show the approximate distribution of the people in the twenty independent states of Latin America. It will be seen that these states fall into nine classes according to the *numerically*

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dominant part or parts of the population. The figures are, of course, approximations taken from what seemed to us to be the best estimates based on such census figures as were available for each country. It should be noted that in most cases the figures in the first column are probably exaggerations, since white status is claimed by everyone who can plausibly do so.

In the last column we have given the date at which the constitution under which the country now operates was promulgated or the régime which governs it came to power through a successful *coup d'état* or revolution.

A glance at the last column of this table will show that even the most fundamental differences in population do

not seem to increase or decrease political instability in Latin America. And it will also be clear that any other table that we might construct, whether it showed contrasts in industrial production, "standard of living," degree of literacy, or other statistics, would show the same lack of correlation with political change by force.

It will be seen that each of the governments listed was recently set up by revolution or *coup d'état*. (In view of Uruguay's reputation for phenomenal internal stability, we may anticipate objection by noting that the Constitution of 1934 was drawn up at the behest of President Gabriel Terra, who had cancelled the Constitution of 1917 by decree, sent the Congress packing, pro-

	White	Percentage Mestizo	of total Indian	population Mulatto	Negro	Date of régime
Argentina	97		3			1958
Uruguay	90	10				1934
Cuba	73			15	12	1959
Brazil	61		2	26	11	1946
Costa Rica	60	38			2	1948
Chile	30	65	5			1932
Colombia	20	68	7		5	1958
Venezuela	20	65	7		8	1958
Nicaragua	17	69	5		9	1936
Paraguay	3	95	2			1954
Honduras	1	90	7		2	1957
El Salvador	11	78	11			1961
Panama	11	65	10		14	1941
Mexico	15	55	29			1925
Ecuador	10	41	39		5	1948
Peru	13	37	49		1	1950
Bolivia	14	30	56			1952
Guatemala	5	35	60			1955
Dominican Republic	28			60	12	1930
Haiti				5	95	1957

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claimed himself dictator, and used the army to suppress revolts against his authority.) It follows, therefore, that in Latin America *all* governments, whether ostensibly "democracies" or "dictatorships," exist only at the sufferance of the nation's armed forces. This is true not only in the sense that the armed forces could carry out a *coup d'état* at any time that they were prepared to act in unison, but also in the sense that the belief that they are willing and ready to suppress any uprising is, in most places, the *only* thing that holds ambitious young revolutionaries in check.

This means that the line of demarcation between "democracy" and "dictatorship" is apt to be fluid and indistinct at best. In Mexico, for example, presidential elections have been held regularly every six years since 1934, and the presidents have served out their terms of office. But although presidential campaigns are staged with great fanfare, partly to amuse the populace and partly to bemuse observers in the United States, everybody in Mexico, from the itinerant bootblacks to the "opposition" candidate, knows perfectly well that, come Hell, high water, or an eruption of Popocatepetl, the "election" will automatically go to the person designated by the tight little oligarchy that runs the Partido Revolucionario Institucional.

Some Mexicans estimate that the Partido's government would not last twenty-four hours, if word got around that the army was not prepared to fight at the wave of a sombrero. Given the present state of comparative prosperity, that may be an exaggeration. But no one doubts the army's power to take over the government at any time that it

wishes to do so, and it is generally believed that the army is completely controlled by General Cárdenas. He is said to be issuing the orders to the present government of Mexico. If that is so, Cárdenas is as much of a dictator as anyone who has openly held office with that title—except, of course, that Cárdenas is a long-time and notorious affiliate of the Communist Conspiracy, and probably would not dare to make any but the most trivial decisions without orders from Moscow. That fact, naturally, makes him a "great democrat" in the jargon of American "Liberals."

CHAPTER NINE *Economics*

FOR A GENERAL SURVEY of Latin America centered on economic conditions and business relationships, we refer the reader to an excellent book by Edward Tomlinson, *LOOK SOUTHWARD, UNCLE* (Devin-Adair, New York; 374 pages, \$6.00). The book may profitably be read in conjunction with an article, "The Latin-American Powder Keg," by Professor G. C. Wiegand, in the Fall, 1960, issue of *Business Horizons*. Both authors refrain from inquiring too closely into the dominant policies and motives of the American State Department in recent years.

One fundamental fact, which emerges more clearly from the article than from the book, is that every country of Latin America contains a large mass of people who barely subsist in extreme poverty, and that for the rest of this century, at least, that mass is going to be there, no matter what the various governments may try to do about it, and no matter what the United States may do to help them. Regrettable as the fact may be, Aladdin's lamp simply

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is not available for the production of economic miracles.

The very *best* that a rational man can hope for in Latin America is a slow and gradual amelioration of the general standard of living over many decades. Even this will be contingent on the maintenance of stable governments with sane economic policies. But the establishment and maintenance of such governments is made very difficult by the prevalence of the myth, created by the Communist Conspiracy and parroted by overgrown children everywhere, that governments have the *power* to abolish poverty. When loose-mouthed politicians talk about "fighting Communism" by "raising the standard of living," they merely endorse the Communist pretense that jinn will bring pie from the sky at a rub of Aladdin's lamp. Economic amelioration can *eventually* be produced by hard and persistent work, but in the meantime we must simply face the fact that Latin-American countries contain masses of potential looters whom the governments must somehow keep in hand.

As Mr. Tomlinson points out, the great need of all Latin-American countries is for productive capital investment—not handouts from Washington, which do no real good and excite only contempt and latent hostility. Capital is needed not only for new enterprises, but most urgently to salvage the existing economic structure. Purchasers must be found for industries owned and supported by the various states.

Socialism, as is inevitable in any state less perfectly organized than the realm of the Incas, has been an economic failure too great to be concealed by the utmost ingenuity and mendac-

ity of bureaucrats. The United States can support for a time a *few* parasitic organisms such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, but no Latin-American nation is rich enough to feed such economic rot. The nationalized industries, whether stolen from foreigners or constructed by the state, are a principal drain on the national economies, and that fact has become obvious everywhere. It is noteworthy that in the past few months Argentina has turned over the development of its oil resources to foreign corporations, authorized the sale of most of the stock in the state steel mill to private investors, and (according to unofficial reports) plans soon to rid itself of the heavy burden of its nationalized railroads. This will set an example for the rest of South America—assuming, of course, that the sober and realistic men who now largely direct the policies of the Frondizi government remain in control.

These developments in Argentina, together with less abrupt changes of policy in Chile and Peru in recent years, give some hope that Latin America may at last be moving toward a free economy of the kind that made the United States. But the distance to go is great, and the obstacles are many. The traditions of Spanish colonialism are still deeply rooted in the public mind and make economic intervention and management seem a natural function of government. Most of the nations have passed through, or are in the midst of, an inflationary orgy, so that drastic austerity will be necessary to produce solvency. The stability of responsible governments is constantly menaced by a history of perennial revolutions that incites ambitious dema-

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gogues, greedy bosses of labor gangs, and a feckless and often spoiled proletariat. And like the United States, Latin America suffers from a plague of "Liberal intellectuals" bred in an inflated and debased educational system. Although these cicadas, who sit in the academic bushes and endlessly stridulate, make a noise far out of proportion to their size, the noise does confuse.

Professor Wiegand reports that "The 'liberals' are in control of most of the major universities . . . It would be difficult to list a dozen prominent Latin-American economists and political scientists . . . who advocate free enterprise. . . . The organizations that champion free enterprise, such as the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Económicas in Mexico City or the Centro de Estudios sobre la Libertad and the Foro de Libre Empresa in Buenos Aires, are privately financed and have little influence on the training of future economists and political leaders."

As in the United States, it is often difficult to distinguish "intellectuals" who are paid agents of the Communist Conspiracy from mere cicadas actuated by nothing more than an instinct to join the chorus that is making so much noise. For example, Dr. Juan José Arévalo was a professor in the University of Tucumán in Argentina and was thought to be merely a "progressive educator" until 1944, when he suddenly flew out of the bush and winged his way to Guatemala, where he became the president of that country and front-man for the Communists. He is now perched in the state university of Rómulo Betancourt's Venezuela, explains that his recently reprinted allegory, *Fábula del tiburón y la sardina*, is directed against the Soviet Union as well

as the United States, and claims that the memoirs that he will soon publish will establish his "historical position" as an "idealist philosopher" who did not have the slightest idea that he was doing the Communists' work for them while he was president of Guatemala. This impudent profession of intellectual irresponsibility and obtuseness will, no doubt, arouse the admiration and applause of "intellectuals" everywhere.

It is generally a waste of time to try to determine the percentage of innocents among the self-styled "intellectuals." As a class, they form a swarm that will stridulate to any rhythm the Communist Conspiracy may set for them.

We may be sure that in the months ahead all the strength of International Communism will be exerted to snuff out any tendency toward a free economy in Latin America. And we may be sure that the efforts of the Conspiracy there will be ably seconded by the motley gang in Washington that has been working desperately for twenty-nine years to break the economic back of the United States and reduce Americans to socialized indigence. Until we recover our own freedom, there is little hope for Latin America.

Even under the most favorable conditions, evolution toward a free economy will necessarily be gradual. In the meantime, all Latin-American countries need capital. And this brings us to the economic fact that capital (except such as may be supplied by Communists for their own purposes) must be obtained in a free market. Everyone knows that capital can be attracted only when the probable rate of return is proportional to the speculative risk involved. And Latin-American coun-

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tries are, on the record, very poor risks. We are constantly reminded that Latin Americans are proud and sensitive, but no real understanding will be possible until they and we face the facts of economic life.

Mr. Tomlinson has sketched the truly remarkable record of American business in Latin America, where our enterprises have accomplished a great deal in spite of harassment and governmental meddling with everything from their capital structure to their labor policies. But over every investment now hangs the threat of confiscation either through the application of laws already on the books but not currently enforced or through a sudden change of régime and the enactment of pseudo-legal piracy. And no one who understands that the "United Nations" is essentially a Communist device for destroying the United States will be astonished to learn from Mr. Tomlinson that that shabby circus has solemnly enacted "resolutions" designed to authorize and encourage the theft of American property abroad. So long as what Frank Meyer has aptly termed our "tower of infamy" remains on our soil as a symbol of the subjection of the American people to the International Communist Conspiracy, there will be little chance for the economic development of Latin America.

The possibilities, however, would be great, if the government in Washington were returned to American control. Our investments in Latin America are going to be made in direct proportion to the safety of the investment; if it is a gamble, then the investors, if sane, will not put up any money unless they have a gambler's chance of quick and large returns. Solid investment of cap-

ital and technical skill on a long-term basis is reasonable only where there is a guarantee of stability.

No country anywhere is obliged to accept the benefits of "dollar imperialism." But if, after due deliberation, it wants those benefits, it must be able to enter into a binding contract to obtain them. And it is quite obvious that, given the record of past instability, a Latin-American country will receive the *most* favorable terms, if its contracts are guaranteed by a treaty with the United States that the United States is frankly prepared to enforce, if necessary. That is simple economics, and no amount of stridulation by "Liberals" can change the facts.

Whether or not the United States should go so far as to undertake such obligations to help Latin-American countries is, of course, another question. There are alternative arrangements, such as the Pan-American Bank that was incidentally proposed by William D. Pawley, former Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, in the course of his recent testimony on Communist activity within our State Department. This bank, which would obtain one half of its capital from the United States and the other half from Latin America, would serve primarily to insure investments against loss by expropriation in return for an annual premium of one or two percent.

It is by no means certain that the necessary capital is available or could be obtained by means that would not be in themselves inflationary, or that the proposed rate of premiums would cover the actuarial risks, but we need not here discuss the feasibility of the scheme. For our present purposes, we need only note that the solvency of the

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bank would have to be guaranteed in some way by the governments concerned, and that the premiums charged by the bank would represent a cost of doing business that would have to be paid ultimately by the Latin-American consumers, who would also have to pay, in one way or another, the expenses incurred by the various governments in raising and guaranteeing the capital.

The important thing is that everyone concerned see clearly the very simple economic factors that govern the economic development and hence the future well-being of Latin America. One may, if one wishes, agree wholeheartedly with the "Liberals" that it would be very, very convenient if babies grew on cabbages. In planning a garden, however, it is well to remember that cabbages produce only cabbages.

We need not here discuss what is essentially a domestic problem, the many economic handicaps that have been put upon us over the years by our own government. On the one hand, many American industries have been forced to price themselves out of the world market, while on the other, the American people have been taxed to give to foreign countries factories designed to ruin American industry. This kind of insanity — to give it no harsher a name — has already brought us to the brink of economic disaster. We here assume that the United States will return to sanity before it has definitively committed suicide.

We also exclude from consideration here the question of economic warfare, assuming that it is our purpose as a nation to maintain the independence of Latin-American countries. A case can be made, of course, for economic subsidies — not the "foreign aid" for

which we have thus far been bled and which, as our experience has abundantly shown, serves only to prepare the way for Bolsheviks, but subsidies rationally given to obtain advantages for the United States. We should not pretend to ourselves, however, that such subsidies would be in any way less imperialistic than the use of troops: their only purpose and justification would necessarily be a kind of concealed conquest. And if we do resort to such indirect warfare, we must conduct it by a coldly rational strategy, unperturbed by the maundering of sentimentalists and do-gooders. The purpose of such subsidies would be to obtain the allegiance and obedience of governments, not to "raise standards of living" or incite "democracy." And, given the political conditions that we noticed above, the real target of the subsidies, however administered, would necessarily be the armed forces of the nation or nations in question.

Subsidies which are an alternative to direct military action obviously do not fall within the scope of normal trade and economics.

CHAPTER TEN

Culture

Some comment under this rubric is called for, since it is now customary for Americans to castigate themselves for their "neglect" of the culture of Latin America. If an adequate and compendious survey of that culture is now in print, it has escaped our notice. We shall have to confine ourselves to a few considerations that we regard as basic.

I

The cultural differences between the United States and Latin America are

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of approximately the same order as the linguistic differences. If you begin the study of Spanish or Portuguese, you are apt to be impressed by the extent to which those languages differ from English and Latin—and if you have no Latin or French, the differences may even seem formidable; but the five languages we have mentioned are not only all Indo-European, but are very closely related within the Indo-European family, and the maximum differences would seem minor and trivial, if compared to what you would encounter if you were studying Arabic or Chinese.

To be sure, the United States and Latin America are divided by differences of tradition and outlook that are accentuated by temperamental differences which may be partly innate. It would be possible to draw a contrast in the manner of Jacques Rivière, who, writing between the First and Second World Wars, undertook a detailed study of the cultures of France and Germany, emerging with the conclusion that the really primary difference was an hereditary, probably racial, "désaccord entre deux rythmes nerveux." Such generalizations are necessarily inaccurate—Rivière himself had to admit that similar differences in nervous organization and temperament existed between the inhabitants of Brittany and Provence, or of Bavaria and Prussia, but thought them less extensive—and while they may be useful to mark contrasts, they will be seriously misleading to anyone who does not remember that the differences, however great they may seem in detail, are comparatively minor and trivial, masking a fundamental unity. All the nations of the West are predominantly European

in population and speak a group of closely related Indo-European languages; what is even more important, they are united by a common culture derived from Greece and Rome, and by a common faith, Christianity.

Within the unity of Occidental civilization, national and regional differences are comparatively small. They are like the differences between Roman Catholic and Lutheran theology, which are indeed important within Christianity, but almost vanish when one compares Christianity with Shinto or Buddhism.

Perception of the scale of differences is fundamental; with a little tolerance and good will, it may even suffice for ordinary purposes. Anyone who wishes to go on to a real understanding of Latin-American culture would do well to start with what is identical, not what is different—with the roots and trunk of the tree, not two or three of its branches. A man from the United States and one from Argentina, each of whom can trace his own culture to its origins and understands its development, will have so much in common that, even if the one knows no word of Spanish and the other no word of English, they can meet intellectually with a reciprocal understanding that could never be attained by superficially educated persons, even if both were voluble in both languages. Unfortunately, it is precisely this common area that has been most obscured by the vogue, in both the United States and Latin America, of cut-rate educations focused on what is contemporary, superficial, and palatable to the simplest minds. The inevitable result is basic incomprehension of both cultures, especially by persons who call themselves

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"experts."

We laugh at fuzzy-minded "educators" who claim that they are promoting "hemispheric solidarity" by teaching youngsters to froth hot chocolate with twirl-sticks, eat tamales, and watch the cavorting of "Calipso dancers."

But more serious "programs" may be equally nugatory. It is true that a nation may be best understood through its literature—but only when the reader understands what literature is. Otherwise, the result is certain to be misunderstanding.

Everyone, presumably, knows what a novel is. An American who reads, for example, Jack London's *Martin Eden* or Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* automatically understands (unless he is very "Liberal" and credulous) that he is dealing with fictions which have a certain verisimilitude but only slight relation to reality; he also understands that the books (since their intrinsic literary value is minimal) are useful only as indications of the sentiments and tastes of the reading public that made them fashionable in their day. That, however, is not obvious to many Latin Americans, who may not only imagine that the scenes described in the books are typical of the United States or some part of it, but may retain that impression, consciously or subconsciously, even after years of residence in the United States. Americans, of course, fall into the corresponding error.

The most widely sold book ever written in Latin America is said to be Jorge Isaacs' *María*. This is a pleasant, though occasionally saccharine, tale of life on a plantation in southern Colombia near the middle of the Nine-

teenth Century. There are some poetic descriptions of landscapes, but the characters are typical of nothing. Like the author, the protagonist is the son of a Jew who migrated from Jamaica to Colombia, turned Christian, married the daughter of a Colombian ship's officer, and purchased a plantation. The heroine is the protagonist's cousin, the orphaned daughter of a Jamaican Jew by an English woman. As a child, she falls in love with the protagonist, and when he is sent to an English university to complete his education, she dies of inherited organic weakness and frustrated love. The story is well written, but, aside from its setting, it owes much more to the conventions of Romantic fiction in French and English literature than to the realities of life in Colombia.

The best-known Mexican novel is probably *El Indio*, by Gregorio López y Fuentes. It is a brilliant sketch, alternately impressionistic and realistic, of an isolated Indian village that is disturbed from time to time by the intrusion of white adventurers, revolutionary leaders, and governmental officials. Few readers will fail to see that the plot has been contrived to compress into a few years incidents which represent symbolically the events of three centuries; few will miss the underlying irony of a story in which the Indians are repeatedly mobilized for this or that purpose which they do not understand, and the survivors end precisely where they started. Far from being a yell for "social reform," the sketch emphasizes the impassable gulf between the voluble do-gooders and the Indians, who "listen without protest and without approval, the very incarnations of their racial apathy, with stony faces

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and eyes of opaque glass," and who, with a kind of animal instinct, "know only that the people who use reason want to hunt them down." The reader will be moved by this hopeless depiction of Mexico as a land in which "hatreds, like packs of dogs, range over the mountains and through the valleys, snarling at one another," but he must remember that, even granting the accuracy of the symbolic picture, he has seen only one aspect of Mexico and has glimpsed but one of fifty major forces that are shaping that nation's future. A novel can never be a political or social analysis; it can convey only an emotional impression through selected or invented details from which it would be madness to generalize.

The most famous poet of all Latin America is Rubén Darío. He was born in Nicaragua and frequently describes, or alludes to, the mountains and sunsets of Central America. He was, however, a pupil of the French *symbolistes*, and what you will learn from him is that a great Spanish poet could—accidentally, as it were—be born in Nicaragua. That, of course, is a significant datum. But you would never hope to understand the United States from the poems of Edgar Allan Poe.

There is a good deal of serious philosophical thought in Latin America, but it is essentially a prolongation of French and Spanish schools. With the exception of a few mystical eccentrics, such as Felix Schwartzmann of Chile, the writers are all so deeply influenced in one way or another by Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset that here again your road to Latin America must begin in Spain.

For what is specifically Latin-American, one could not do better than

begin with such books as Julio Irazusta's *Tomás de Anchorena* (Buenos Aires, 1950). It is an intellectual biography of a great Argentinian (1784-1847), who, although he refused political office, probably did more than any other one man to make his country independent of Spain. The author is a man of great cultivation and learning, and in the back of his mind throughout this historical study is the question, Why did not independence bring to Argentina the national stamina and vigor that it brought to the United States?

Irazusta may not always be right, and he certainly is not given to flattery of the United States, but he represents the Latin America with which we can reach an honorable and firm understanding precisely because it is aware of its own traditions and of what they imply. The ideas in Irazusta's book will probably seem strange to a number of Americans who are now teaching college courses about Latin America; that merely proves that you can learn more about the essentials from one work of sober and reflective historical analysis than from all the novels ever published between the Rio Grande and the Straits of Magellan.

II

Latin-American culture is in many countries threatened by an antithetical force which has largely escaped notice because it has never explicitly proclaimed all of its objectives, preferring to masquerade as a literary movement called *indigenismo* or as "nationalism" or as "agrarian reform." This concealment is facilitated by long-standing traditions, by a social system in which the old, land-owning families have

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usually managed to retain a certain superiority, and by the natural human disinclination to view the horrors of a future that may be averted by some miracle.

It is still difficult for most Latin Americans to envisage a situation that was literally unthinkable a century ago. The old assumptions are illustrated by the fact that at several of the conferences that sought to devise constitutions for the newly independent nations of South America, the leaders present, who were, almost without exception, creoles of pure Spanish lineage, seriously considered proposals to find a lineal descendent of the last Inca and crown him king or emperor of their country. The proposals reflected, of course, an implicit belief in the value of aristocratic and royal descent combined with notions of race formed at a time when even the circulation of the blood was unknown, no one had dreamed of chromosomes and genes, and all human differences were attributed to astrological influences or education. The proponents took it for granted that the new Inca would be a devout Catholic, would read Cicero and Voltaire in the original texts, would compose Spanish verse, and would observe the intricate etiquette of polite society. His Indian origins would be as essentially meaningless as Aztec decorations in the lobby of a modern American hotel. This combination of ideas did not seem illogical at the time; it never occurred to anyone that Occidental civilization could be challenged.

But it is now challenged by aggressive doctrines which exalt the culture of the pre-Colombian Indians, denigrate that of the West, describe "Amer-

ica" as a hemisphere whose glorious history has been temporarily interrupted by the intrusion of the white man, and lead inevitably to the concept of racial war. The arguments used to support these doctrines may be most conveniently examined in the book by Alejandro Lipschutz, *Indoamericanismo y el problema racial de las Américas* (Santiago de Chile, 1944), to which Sverker Arnoldsson's *Los momentos históricos de América* (Madrid, 1956) is a useful supplement. The movement has come farthest into the open in Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia.

In Mexico, at least, political *indigenismo* in various guises antedates the nation's independence, and its evolution may be traced through the five volumes of Lucas Alamán's *Historia de México*, which, though first published in 1883-85, remains the most detailed and judicious treatment of the period. It should, however, be read in conjunction with Luis Villoro's *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (Mexico, 1950), which will exhibit some very significant transvaluations.

The present régime in Mexico is the result of a long and complicated series of civil wars that began in 1911. Henry B. Parkes is essentially correct in his *History of Mexico* (Boston, 1950) when he says that the net effect of the long and bloody upheaval was "a profound change in the national consciousness. Its meaning was that Mexico was primarily an Indian nation." This has become an accepted fact: no one in Mexico today would dare to set up a statue of Cortes or even display a portrait of the great *conquistador* on the walls of his living room. But the ré-

gime has attained a certain stability and equilibrium.

The attempt to stamp out Christianity ended in failure. The system of agrarian communes proclaimed by General Lázaro Cárdenas when the Communists put him in power in 1934 was an attempt to return to Indian institutions, but it had to be abandoned, and the confiscated property has naturally gravitated back into the hands of large landowners, some of whom, including General Cárdenas, now hold immense tracts in many parts of the country. Business is prosperous, and everything now appears normal. When the visitor attends an opera at the Bellas Artes or dines with a creole family that has somehow survived and maintains its own traditions at home, and shrugs cynically at the rodomontade of the politicians, it seems absurd to suppose that the present equilibrium could ever be broken. But there are powerful forces moving under the surface.

The most opprobrious term that can be applied to anyone in Mexico is *malinchista*, although no one knows precisely what the term includes. Malinche was the name given by the Aztecs to a Mayan princess who, having fallen into the hands of the Tabascans as a slave, was given to Cortes and became his mistress and the mother of his son. She was devoted to Cortes, sustaining his spirit in times of adversity and giving him sagacious advice in his operations against the Aztecs (whom she cordially hated as the oppressors of her own tribe). Strictly speaking, therefore, a *malinchista* is an Indian who collaborates with white men or accepts their civilization. In Mexico today, however, the term is

illogically used in the sense of "anti-Mexican" and its limits are left vague. It is obviously *malinchismo* to form friendships with "Yankees," exhibit a motion picture produced in Spain or France, or watch a game of baseball, but it is not yet clear whether the same heinous offense is committed by attending a Christian church, and no one has thus far publicly proposed to replace the Cathedral with a *teocalli*. The more enthusiastic opponents of *malinchismo* hope to suppress Spanish as the national language, but they find themselves in much the same plight as the Hindus, who have so many native languages that they have to retain the hated English as the only available means of communicating with each other. Thus far, *anti-malinchismo* seems more comic than sinister, but it is noteworthy that Communist agents foster and subsidize the movement.

Much depends on General Cárdenas, who is of Indian descent and has promised to bring to Mexico the joys of Mao Tse-tung's China. He is said to have strong feelings about *malinchismo*, but it is unlikely that he would dare seriously to modify the Kremlin's plans for butchery in Mexico, and there is thus far no indication that the Communists intend to conduct the scheduled revolution in Mexico on a racial basis. In present circumstances, indeed, it is hard to see what they would have to gain by proclaiming open race war before they are ready to invade the United States. At that time, we may be certain, they will revive the famous "Plan of San Diego" of 1914, and *anti-malinchismo* may be a discreet preparation for that goal. At present, it seems to be merely a means of intimidating Mexicans who favor co-op-

eration with the United States.

The situation is quite different in Peru, where the creoles still retain a political power that they lost in Mexico almost a century ago. The most powerful single force in Peru is the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, whose adherents are known as *Apristas*. This movement, which has always been partly clandestine with secret members and secret doctrines known only to a small inner circle, appears to have been founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a bizarre "Liberal" who can allude to Einstein and Spengler, discourse about the historical applications of the concept of time-space, and write with the adroit mixture of learning and incoherence that never fails to titillate "intellectuals." He cuts his highest caper, however, as a "social philosopher" who claims to be (a) a Marxist dialectician of the first rank and (b) not a Marxist at all because his Marxism is "native American" and "imposed by the conditions of American history." From the very first, he and his party have been financed from Moscow, which also maintains in Peru an orthodox Communist party to give point to Haya de la Torre's claim that he alone can save Peru from Communism.

The "Apristas" patiently built up a very strong organization, partly open and partly underground, and became a formidable political force by intriguing with, and then double-crossing, short-sighted politicians. In 1948, they attempted a revolution from which Peru was saved only by the intervention of General Manuel Odría. Both the "Apristas" and the ordinary Communists were outlawed, but since both had large underground organizations,

the law merely inhibited the more open form of subversion. Haya de la Torre took refuge in the Colombian Embassy in Lima and for more than five years directed his conspiracy from that diplomatic asylum.

In 1956, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, a professed conservative and candidate for the presidency, made a secret deal with the "Aprista" conspiracy whereby, in return for votes which would assure his election, he undertook to have repealed the legislation that outlawed subversion, and to permit Haya de la Torre to resume his activities. The agreement was kept on both sides.

Señor Prado doubtless hoped that during his six-year term of office he could find some way of neutralizing the "Apristas." They are, however, by far the best organized party in Peru, and almost certainly control a numerical majority of the population—probably also of the electorate (from which illiterates are supposedly excluded). Observers believe, therefore, that the "Apristas" will have no difficulty in winning the elections scheduled for this coming summer, and will take over, unless the Peruvian army again intervenes. The extent to which the army has been infiltrated is variously estimated.

A formal analysis of "Aprismo" would require an inordinate amount of space. For one thing, the standard technique is to complicate what is basically simple with involved discussion and theoretical hair-splitting; this conveys the impression that big brains are hard at work, and produces a kind of pap that is appetizing to children enrolled in universities. For another, the party line conforms to whatever is expedient at the moment. The normal

doctrine is hatred of the "Yankee imperialists," but during the Second World War the "Apristas" exhibited a flexibility as great as that of the Communist Party in the United States: at the proper moment, one of Haya de la Torre's acolytes, Manuel Seoane, burst into print with an impassioned demonstration that all Latin America must forthwith enter into the closest economic, political, and military alliances with "the great democracy of the North" to save the world from Hitler. Of course, as soon as the world had been saved for Soviet Russia, we reverted to our former status of "Yankee imperialists." The current party line is that the "Apristas" want no violence or drastic change—perish the thought! They are just decorous idealists who want to block Communism by "helping the underprivileged" through "long-term economic evolution." These ideals will be firmly maintained until the "Apristas" are sure that they can outshoot the army.

The basic doctrines of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana can easily be seen through the fog of verbiage with which they are normally surrounded. For one thing, although it is now attracting attention only in Peru and there exploits "nationalism" for all that the vague sentiment is worth, it professes to be "Pan-Latin-American" and promises "joint action" by all the Latin-American countries that it takes over. It does have organizations in other countries, but it is difficult to estimate their strength since individuals skip back and forth between "Apra" and the ordinary Communist parties with the greatest of ease. For example, Haya de la Torre, Rómulo Betancourt (the Communist

who now controls Venezuela with the help of subsidies from the United States; see *AMERICAN OPINION*, April, 1960), and José Figueres (Fidel Castro's pal, whom we briefly described in September, 1960, p. 24) joined in founding a violently anti-American magazine significantly entitled *Combate*. "Apra" and the Communist parties often denounce one another bitterly, and always operate with perfect coordination.

"Apra" distinguishes itself by claiming to be "native American," and it is true that its program, when reduced to its essentials, singularly resembles the régime of the Incas, although the "Apristas" have thus far failed to nominate a new Inca. All land and industry is to be "nationalized" and operated by the government. (Current propaganda mentions only land and industry owned by foreigners, and maintains a discreet silence about the rest.) The basic doctrine is that the "riches of the New World" were "stolen" from the Indians by the Europeans, and must therefore be returned to their "rightful owners."

The "Apristas" are mobilizing the Indians and poorer mestizos against the whites, who, with a considerable group of the more responsible mestizos, have long controlled the government of Peru. Many of the Indians, at least, believe that when the "Apristas" come to power, Spanish will be replaced by Quéchua and Aymará as official languages, and that the Indians will "come into their own." Propaganda among the Indians is conducted orally in the native languages, and is known to include, on occasion, incitement to hatred of the whites, who are "oppressors," and of the mestizos, who are

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"bastards." Similar propaganda on an entirely different level is carried on in the venerable University of San Marcos, which has been deeply penetrated by the Communists; the real center of subversion, according to reports from reliable sources, is the Department of Ethnology, which extols the "brilliant civilization" of the Inca Empire, deplores its overthrow by the "rapacious and barbarous Christians," and encourages mestizos to take pride in their Indian, rather than their white, heritage.

"Apra" has, as one would expect, ample funds. Its most effective single device, perhaps, is the maintenance of centers in the various towns and cities. These establishments offer free "adult education," free dental and medical service, and, best of all, serve good meals at a mere fraction of the cost. (According to a recent report, a full meal may be had in the spacious Casa de Pueblo in Lima for the equivalent of fifteen cents!) Peruvians who use these services always find at their table or near them in the waiting rooms other patrons who are eager to explain the benefactions and ideals of "Apra."

If the "Apristas" take over after the elections, they will undoubtedly move slowly at first, to demonstrate their legality. It is possible that the orthodox Communists will be instructed to stage a revolt for the "Apristas" to suppress. The same tactic could be used to confuse the issues, should the army take action.

The "Apristas" have roused forces of the most ominous kind. Peru under their control could become the first country in the Western Hemisphere officially to repudiate Occidental civilization. It would also be the ideal spot

for the introduction of racial warfare along the lines now habitually used in Africa. It is true that the Communist government in Bolivia is officially promoting the "progressive" elimination of white men from Bolivia, but it has thus far tried to prevent this aspect of its policy from becoming known outside the country. The "Apristas" could have the distinction of being the first in Latin America to raise the battle-cry, "Give it back to the Indians!"

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Anti-Americanism

LATIN AMERICA began with an antipathy toward the Anglo-Saxons; until the time of Napoleon, England was the principal enemy of the Spanish Empire. This sentiment was considerably modified by the American Revolution, in which the Spanish Empire was allied with the American colonists against the British; and later the Monroe Doctrine excited no little gratitude and admiration, since most Latin Americans recognized it as the principal guarantee of their independence.

Perfect sympathy and reciprocal love is not to be expected between nations under even the most favorable circumstances, and it would be easy to compile from Latin-American publications of the Nineteenth Century expressions of opinion comparable to, and as varied as, the opinions contemporaneously expressed in the United States about Great Britain, France, and Germany. There is no indication of a real animus against the United States until about the turn of the century, and even then the sentiment is both mild and sporadic.

The sentiment was in part excited by the discovery that the United States

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had become one of the wealthiest and most powerful nations in the world: envy is a natural and inevitable human feeling, and only the naive would imagine that one can have power without exciting jealousy. Among the cultivated classes of Latin America, however, a far more potent influence was a conception of Occidental culture most authoritatively expounded by Guglielmo Ferrero. This has been so generally forgotten in the United States that we should remind ourselves of it, lest we mistake the causes of a certain hostility toward us.

Ferrero was an Italian psychologist who turned historian and won a great and not entirely undeserved fame in the period that preceded the First World War. His *Greatness and Decline of Rome* in five volumes was actually a "best seller" in the United States, and he was the guest of Theodore Roosevelt in the White House, where he was received with honors now reserved for mendicant Prime Ministers. He travelled and lectured extensively in South America, where he propounded a theory that his audiences found most convincing.

Ferrero believed, on the whole correctly, that contemporary civilization was decadent and headed for disaster. He came, however, to identify Occidental culture with *le génie latin*, the "spirit" of the Catholic nations of Europe (and hence of Latin America). This high culture, he thought, was menaced by comparatively new and semi-barbarous nations, particularly Germany and the United States, whose relatively crude inhabitants were driven by an almost daemonic *Wille zur Macht*. The Germans and Americans believed in quantity instead of quality, size in-

stead of elegance, masses instead of individuals, technology instead of humanism, mass production instead of craftsmanship, machines instead of art, materialism instead of culture; they were the new Goths, boisterous and unscrupulous, imperialistic and commercially ruthless, bent on the destruction of the ordered and harmonious civilization of the Latin peoples.

Ferrero's analysis of contemporary culture was more than half right, and while his notion that the disintegrating forces were peculiarly German and American now seems preposterous, it was sufficiently supported by appearances to seem plausible at the time. As a matter of fact, this theory, tactfully revised to omit the name of the United States, was later used with great effect to prepare Americans for participation in the First World War.

The opinions expounded by Ferrero were far more efficacious in arousing antipathy toward the United States in Latin America than anything done by the American government before 1913, and they have left a spiritual aftermath with which we must still reckon. This however, would present no great problem, if we as a nation replaced our hackneyed twaddle about "democracy" and "world peace" with a frank recognition of contemporary realities. The disasters of recent decades have demonstrated to all but the most perversely blind the essential unity of Occidental civilization, and the grim fact that all of the nations of the West are at present literally fighting for their lives against the primeval forces of barbarism and savagery that have now, for the first time in history, been mobilized and directed by an extremely efficient and utterly vicious international con-

spiracy. The intelligent people of Latin America can see that, and we could count on them, if they had any reason to believe that they could count on us.

Our "Liberals" have made it virtually a dogma in the United States that we have alienated the Latin Americans by various acts of "imperialism" and intervention in their affairs. For this there is some foundation, but we should make sure of the charges against us before we enter a blanket confession. We shall therefore review, as concisely as possible, our principal sins.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Creation of Panama

EARL HARDING, who began his investigations in 1908, has reported this episode in our history in his recent and authoritative book, *THE UNTOLD STORY OF PANAMA* (Athene Press; distributed by the Bookmailer, New York; 210 pages, \$6.00). Since the International Communist Conspiracy, with the aid of the many traitors that it has planted in our government, has been working assiduously since 1935 to strip the United States of the Panama Canal and thus sever the military and commercial artery that has been aptly called our jugular vein, this is a book of fundamental importance to every American. We here limit ourselves to stating the nature of American intervention that was preliminary to our construction of the canal.

Americans will feel that many details of the story are sordid. We can offer them only the sorry consolation that the record before the time at which Mr. Harding takes up the story is even more sordid.

When Ferdinand de Lesseps brought the Suez Canal to completion in 1869,

he naturally sought an opportunity for another spectacular feat of engineering, and finally settled on the old project of constructing a canal to parallel the American-owned railroad across the Isthmus of Panama, which was in the territory of the United States of Colombia. He became president of a French corporation organized for that purpose, and work got under way. It is true that un-anticipated difficulties were encountered, ranging from the torrential floods of the Chagres River to yellow fever, but these were trifles in comparison with the fact that de Lesseps, who really wanted to build the canal, was being used as a figurehead by an incredible gang of French politicians and international financiers. Only a tiny fraction of the capital raised was available for construction of the canal. The sober *Encyclopaedia Britannica* summarizes the operations of the Panama Canal Company as "characterized by a degree of corruption and extravagance rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of the world."

When the inevitable crash finally came, an attempt was made to place the blame entirely on de Lesseps, who was then eighty-four and had evidently not suspected the character and purposes of his associates. The attempt was not entirely successful. De Lesseps died a poor and broken man, but some part of the truth was disclosed in the great "Panama Scandal," which was precipitated primarily by the efforts of a group of young Frenchmen who were trying to hunt down the persons whom they regarded as responsible for the disgrace and suicide of General Boulanger. American readers of modern French literature may remember something of the atmosphere of those days

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from the pages of Maurice Barrès' *Leurs figures*.

A New Panama Canal Company was organized, partly to cover up the scandal and partly, it seems, with some intention of completing the canal. At all events, work was resumed for a time, but it was eventually halted for reasons which are not yet entirely clear, and the value of the company's securities naturally declined on the market.

The United States, in the meantime, had come to realize that a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific through Central America was indispensable to the nation's security as well as prosperity. The most feasible route was evidently through Nicaragua, where an American corporation had begun construction. In 1902, the House of Representatives passed a bill appropriating money for the completion of this canal.

It is at this point that Mr. Harding begins his narrative. A syndicate of American bankers had bought up secretly the devalued shares of the French company, obviously planning to sell the property to the American government. Among these operators, by the way, was Paul M. Warburg, the father of the James P. Warburg who began in September, 1956, the current drive to cripple the United States by "internationalizing" the Panama Canal.

A prominent (and eventually very wealthy) American attorney, William Nelson Cromwell, appeared as a lobbyist and succeeded in blocking the construction of the canal in Nicaragua. The American government, including President Theodore Roosevelt, was finally persuaded to purchase the French property and concession in Panama at a figure which, although much lower

than what the syndicate had originally hoped to obtain, yielded a fantastically handsome profit.

After the arrangement with the Panama Company had been made, the Colombian senate refused to ratify the necessary treaty, partly because the Colombian constitution forbade the alienation of sovereignty over the Canal Zone, and partly because Colombia thought that it could use the occasion to extract ten million dollars from either the Canal Company or the United States.

A Colombian physician in the employ of the Panama Railroad, Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero, was summoned to New York and Washington; he was given the necessary assurances, and was provided with a flag of the "Republic of the Isthmus" and funds to promote an itch for independence. With seven associates, all connected in one way or another with the Canal Company or its subsidiary, he enlisted fifty patriots who, for a small fee, were willing to join in proclaiming Panama a free and independent nation.

Since Dr. Amador's wife prevented him from running away at the crucial moment, Panama became independent on 3 November, 1903. For \$15,000 the Colombian general in command of the troops in Panama saw that resistance was hopeless. The colonel in command of re-enforcements that had unexpectedly arrived in Colon settled for \$8,000 and a ticket home. American warships were patrolling the coasts to make sure that Colombia could not send fresh troops to suppress the revolution, and in one place American marines were landed for the information of inhabitants who did not know that they had spontaneously revolted from Colombia.

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The United States Consul, who had stood by with the Stars and Stripes to protect Dr. Amador from possible misadventure in carrying out his revolution, was promptly instructed to recognize the new government, and forty-six minutes later the Republic of Panama appointed as its Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington the director-general of the Old Panama Canal Company, who was also a large stock holder in the New. The necessary treaty was promptly drawn, and was ratified by Panama in December, 1903, and by the United States Senate in February, 1904.

It should be noted that the original plan had called for a "Republic of the Isthmus" which would include only a broad strip of land for the canal, and could have been quietly and conveniently annexed at some future date. Dr. Amador, however, made the mistake of enlisting as a member of his original *junta* a patriot who refused to have a revolution unless it included his farms upcountry. So the scope was enlarged to include the whole of the Colombian Department of Panama, and the name of the new nation was changed accordingly. In the light of later developments, this modification of the original plan was most unfortunate.

This was in many ways a model revolution. The victory, which included the surrender of three generals in the Colombian army, was won with total casualties of one Chinese laundryman and one donkey. The United States promptly paid off with ten million dollars, and the National Assembly of the Republic of Panama promptly disbursed \$3,000,000 of this to leading patriots for "necessary expenses" incurred during the revolution—and as prompt-

ly burned the accounts and other records. Other dividends were paid later.

What happened is quite clear and beyond doubt. Unfortunately, Theodore Roosevelt, under the pressure of domestic politics, felt at first obliged to pretend that a spontaneous revolt by the "people of Panama" had just miraculously occurred at the right time to the complete astonishment of the United States. This exposed him—and the nation—to blackmail by the high-minded patriots of Panama, which they began during his campaign for reelection in 1904, and also involved him in a most injudicious and high-handed attempt to punish some newspapers for reporting some of the facts—an attempt which seriously impaired his dignity and prestige. He appeared in a far more worthy role when he finally told an audience in California, "I took the Isthmus!"

The part played in these events by unsavory speculators should not affect our perception of the fact that Theodore Roosevelt performed a great service to his country and, incidentally, to all of Latin America, which has profited immeasurably from the existence of the Panama Canal. That is a fact which no candid Latin American can deny, nor can he deny that he and his countrymen are much happier that the canal is owned by the United States, which, as subsequent events proved, was in any case the only power which could have completed and protected that vital waterway.

There is no indication that, outside of Columbia, any great indignation was excited in Latin America by the means that the United States had used to acquire the Canal Zone. Latin Americans were much too accustomed to

such procedures as that by which Chile, only a few years before, had taken the province that was Bolivia's outlet to the Pacific, and had, by a quick shift, gone on to take part of Peru, to feel or pretend to feel moral indignation. The few people who were interested, however, did note the hypocrisy with which the American government had tried to cloak its action, and also noted that in setting up a puppet state that included a whole department of Colombia we had gone much farther than necessary. It was impossible to explain to them that Dr. Amador, the "father of his country," had exceeded his instructions in doing this. During the construction of the canal, however, Latin America was principally occupied with contemplation of the anticipated benefits, which, indeed, did come to pass. Nicaragua, to be sure, was bitterly disappointed that the canal was not being constructed in her territory, but she wisely guaranteed to the United States by treaty the right to build a second canal, and hoped for the best.

Colombia felt a natural and justified resentment: a part of the country had been taken away without compensation. We finally paid her \$25,000,000 in 1922, but by that time the resentment had become a settled grievance, and Colombia's entirely reasonable complaints had aroused considerable sympathy elsewhere in Latin America, for the benefits conferred by the Panama Canal had come to be taken for granted.

One result of the Gilbert-and-Sullivan operetta that we financed was the creation of an artificial nation of Panamanians, who early began yapping about our "invasion" of their "sov-

ereignty." Dr. Amador's concession to the farm-owner has indeed cost us dear. Perhaps the only feasible and just solution—assuming, of course, that the United States intends to continue to exist as an independent nation—will be a return to the original plan. We can simply occupy the whole of the watershed and other territory necessary for the operation and protection of the canal, as provided in our treaty of 1903 with the "Republic of Panama," and then, with sincere apologies and whatever further compensation may seem equitable, hand back the rest of that country to Colombia, which may have some use for it.

So realistic a procedure would doubtless induce apoplexy in many of our "Liberals." That would be an added benefit. The principal advantage, however, would be the clearing away of a tattered and dusty web of hypocrisy and pretense, so that our relations with the authentic nations of Latin America could be put on a frank and open basis. An amicable understanding with the "nation" that, by underwriting Dr. Amador's ineptitude, we set up to cloak our activities, has become impossible. Virtually all the "Panamanians" now living have imbibed from their earliest years a body of myths about their "glorious revolution," and these tales, although absurd and self-contradictory, have so permeated the emotional fiber of a naturally emotional people that they cannot be eradicated by historical facts.

The shameful betrayal of American interests by the American government in the treaties of 1936 and 1955, culminating in Eisenhower's order, issued in contempt of the Congress of the United States, that the Panamanian

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flag should be flown as a "symbol of sovereignty" over our property, places us in a hopeless position in any negotiations for permission to make even needed improvements in the canal itself. Any military man will tell you that only occupation of the area originally planned for the Canal Zone will enable us to protect the canal from the sabotage that the Communist Conspiracy will, of course, order at the opportune moment.

It is true that our title to the Canal Zone was acquired by a procedure that was undeniably imperialistic. Although we could argue that the present residents in Panama or their fathers accepted and endorsed the acts of our employees in creating the "Republic of Panama" and in giving us not only the Canal Zone but also, as the original treaty specifically stated, "any other lands and waters outside of the Zone which may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection" of the canal, it is pointless to draw fine distinctions. Our title to the needed territory in Panama is probably little better, as it is certainly no worse, than our title to any part of the United States. Those who accept the legal and moral arguments against our occupation of the Canal Zone should prove their sincerity by making immediate preparations for the deportation or massacre of all Americans now living in the United States who are not lineal descendants of the aborigines. The same standard would necessarily call for a reduction in the population of Latin America by the percentages shown in the table in Chapter 8 above, but that, presumably, would not be our responsibility.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Intervention in Mexico

THE OUTLINES of this story are fairly simple, but a sketch of the background will be necessary to show its real significance.

I

The revolutions which had become the principal occupation of energetic Mexicans, and had bestowed on their country fifty-two officially established presidents, dictators, and emperors in fifty-nine years, came to a halt in 1877, when General Porfirio Díaz led his army into Mexico City, with the result that the Mexican Congress discovered that he had been elected president the year before.

Díaz was a mestizo, the descendant of an Andalusian who had emigrated to Mexico in the Sixteenth Century and of a chieftain of an Indian tribe. This was a fact of fundamental importance, for experience had shown that the creoles were incapable of the cohesion necessary to maintain a rule over the masses of Indians, but were also unwilling to accept dominion by a full-blooded Indian such as Benito Juárez, whom they would probably have opposed even if he had not shown a determined though slightly disguised, hostility to Christianity.

Díaz was a man of very considerable abilities and probably sincere in his purposes. Mexican etiquette requires anyone starting a revolution to announce a "plan" which bears the name of the place in which it was actually or supposedly drawn up. Díaz' "Plan of Tuxtepec" was quite plausible, and, after attaining power, he departed from it less than most revolutionaries. He is usually called a "dictator," but we must note that he scrupulously re-

tired from the presidency at the end of his four-year term, and that, after the intervening presidency of González (who, to be sure, was his friend), he was re-elected to the presidency in formal and regular elections in 1884, 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900, 1904, and 1910. All of his legislation was duly enacted by a regularly elected Congress.

It is true that Díaz and his party attained electoral victories as invariably as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional which now runs Mexico, but he *was* popular and he had brought to his country domestic peace (a state of affairs which a few old men could recollect having seen in their infancy) and a prosperity for which there was no precedent at all. There is no proof whatsoever that a majority of the Mexican voters would have elected anyone else to the presidency so long as Díaz was a candidate.

The Mexican government was rather tightly controlled by the fairly numerous members of the educated class, and these in turn showed an extraordinary loyalty to Díaz. It is true that some policies, such as the purchase of certain railroads by the government, may have been ill advised, and that no one thought of building schools which the Indians would have refused to attend or of raising wages to artificially high levels by edict. It is also probably true that Díaz, who exhibited in his last years both overconfidence and irresolution, became somewhat senile when he reached the age of eighty.

Díaz found a bankrupt and ruined nation, and, although he spent large sums on public works (such as drainage of the Valley of Mexico), he left it not only solvent but with a handsome surplus in its treasury. Most of

the railroads of Mexico were built (by private enterprise) during his régime; industries were established, land was irrigated, and mineral resources were found and exploited, producing a national prosperity that has not since been equalled. Large amounts of American capital were attracted to the country, and, what was equally important, many Americans of modest means, seeking opportunities for their skill and enterprise, went to live in Mexico as merchants, engineers, or farmers. With very few exceptions, they were welcomed by the educated class and by Mexicans generally. There were so few instances of serious friction that we of today can only marvel at a record that seems almost incredible.

The very great services rendered to Mexico by these Americans—not the few large oil companies, but men who worked for themselves, prospecting for oil, reopening forgotten mines, establishing drug stores, setting up machine shops, or selling such novelties as metal plows—have been forgotten in both Mexico and the United States. Since Díaz did not kill these Americans and confiscate their property, he undoubtedly was, in the vocabulary of our “Liberals,” a “reactionary.”

II

In 1908 Francisco Madero, a wealthy young creole who claimed to be of pure Spanish stock and had been educated in the United States, published a booklet in which he attacked Díaz for being subservient to the United States, destroying the freedom of the press, and preventing free elections. Since there was no interference with the publication and distribution of this booklet in Mexico, it went through

three editions and created such an impression that an opposition party nominated Madero as its candidate for the presidency against Díaz.

Díaz was re-elected, but Madero had set up a revolutionary organization in San Antonio, Texas, a city which he called "San Luis Potosí" in his press releases. Soon after the election, therefore, he issued from his hotel in that city a proclamation that he was the President of Mexico and had declared war on the "usurper" Díaz. He had some supporters in Mexico who were able to make their first real impression by disseminating among the ignorant the report that Mexicans who visited the United States ran the risk of being lynched by mobs. Madero was well supplied with funds, and from his base in the United States he was able to promote a revolution which, although it at first fizzled out quite ingloriously, was eventually successful. Díaz, after trying to restore peace by compromise, resigned and went to France. A special election was then held and won by Madero.

To judge from his writings, Madero was an idealist, but in his eagerness to promote his revolution he had, publicly or secretly, promised almost everything to almost everybody, with the facility of a Franklin D. Roosevelt. His régime was of short duration, and unless Madero left confessions which may yet come to light, historians will never be certain whom he planned to double-cross the most.

Madero naturally found himself confronted by administrative problems as soon as he attained power, but his great achievement had been the restoration of a certain social consciousness that had been almost forgotten during

the long peace, and this, in turn, produced a new equality of opportunity. It soon became apparent that anyone who had a printing press and a few cases of Winchester could be President. A whistle would call from the mesquite scores of the "underprivileged," all eager to have fun with a gun. Financial problems were solved with the press, for currency backed by lead instead of gold is always accepted at par so long as the army is in town.

Eight revolutions against Madero were soon under way in different parts of the country, and there may have been more, for in the confusion of shifting "alliances" it was often difficult to tell just who was revolting against whom, and no one appears to have computed the total number of "generals" who were conducting campaigns for more democracy and fewer Mexicans. Other candidates were slow in starting, among whom we need mention only Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuilla, who appears to have been awaiting the conclusion of certain mysterious negotiations with unidentified persons in the United States.

Madero lasted until five thousand of his troops in Mexico City decided to revolt for themselves. Other troops in the city remained loyal, and after ten days of brisk cannon fire had killed thousands of civilians and a number of soldiers, the victor appeared to be one of Madero's generals, an Aztec named Victoriano Huerta, who then attempted a general pacification by inviting Madero and his Vice President to resign.

Madero was accordingly succeeded by Pedro Lascuráin, who is believed to have set a record by holding the chief

executive power of the Republic of Mexico for approximately forty minutes. He was relieved of the cares of office by Huerta, who had placed Madero and Pino Suárez under arrest. The latter were killed on their way to prison when a real or simulated attempt to rescue them was made.

III

Huerta appears to have been generally accepted by the Mexican people—astonishingly enough, twenty-five of the twenty-seven state governors recognized his authority. The support given to the Aztec who had so suddenly emerged from obscurity must have been largely determined by the fact that, as soon as he attained power, he proclaimed himself a loyal follower of Díaz, claiming that he had “avenged” the revolution against the so-called “dictator.” Now no one would contend that Mexico under Díaz had been a terrestrial Paradise, but the turmoil, destruction, and suffering that Madero’s “ideals” had inflicted on the nation made the régime of Díaz seem almost a Golden Age to educated and responsible men.

It is idle to speculate on how long Huerta might have lasted under other circumstances. What happened was that Carranza was at last ready to move, and that Woodrow Wilson, who had been elected President of the United States, was about to take office.

Some students of the period share the opinion of Nemesio García Naranjo, who was the Mexican Minister of Public Instruction, that Carranza “started his revolution only after Wilson’s full approval and support had been assured.” There is no proof of this, however, and the theory is partly

negated by numerous indications that Wilson’s sympathies were for a long time divided between Carranza and Carranza’s temporary ally, a distinguished cattle-thief, train-robber, and professional assassin named Doroteo Arango, who had found it expedient, after escaping from prison, to change his name to Pancho Villa and to set himself up in the more lucrative business of being a general. It may be regarded as certain, however, that Carranza was assured of support from some elements in the United States.

Since the following part of our summary will differ in important details from the accounts usually purveyed to Americans, we point out that all statements regarding the activities of the American government and its agents are taken from testimony given before a subcommittee of the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations during the first session of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, and published by the Government Printing Office in 1919. We call special attention to Part Six of these hearings, which contains the testimony of the late William F. Buckley, a man of unimpeachable probity who had long resided in Mexico, had witnessed many of the transactions we shall mention, was regarded by cultivated Mexicans as conspicuously the best friend of their country, and was described by his contemporary, Van Zandt Wheeler (in a privately printed collection of reminiscences), as “the wisest man I have ever known.”

This is not the place to analyze the character and conduct of Woodrow Wilson. We merely summarize the facts that appear to be crucial on the basis of the testimony, and do not attempt to suggest what motives or pres-

tures may have actuated the President of the United States.

IV

Immediately after his inauguration, if not before, Mr. Wilson began a series of intrigues which he carefully concealed from the American Ambassador to Mexico and probably, in part, from the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Mr. Wilson's principal agent was his Special Envoy, a strange person of Swedish origin named John Lind, who knew no word of Spanish, had never been in Mexico, knew nothing of Mexican affairs, and was therefore, according to Mr. Wilson, ideally qualified to negotiate with Huerta and other Mexicans because his ignorance was a guarantee that he would be unprejudiced. Lind was described by Mr. Buckley as a person "who, in need of civilization himself, wants to civilize the rest of the world." Lind, however, had other important qualifications which were epitomized in his statement to Mr. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, the American *Chargé d'Affaires* in Mexico; being informed that a number of priests had just been butchered, "Mr. Lind stated that this was good news, that the more Catholic priests they killed in Mexico the better it would suit him, and the more pleased the President [Wilson] would be."

Mr. Wilson did not rely entirely on Lind's humanitarian instincts. He had a whole crew of personal representatives crawling over Mexico. There was, for example, the Reverend Henry Allen Tupper, a "missionary" whose Christian zeal for social justice was secretly stimulated by cheques from Carranza payable in good American gold. There was the Reverend John R. Silliman,

who was really a dairyman and sold milk to Carranza's family and friends both before and after he became Special Representative of the United States. There was Mr. H. L. Hall, an American of tarnished reputation who was so beloved in Cuernavaca, where he had lived for a number of years, that when he was kidnapped by General Zapata and held for a ransom of twenty dollars (\$20), his neighbors refused to pay it. The half-dozen other specimens that crawled out from under the woodwork to become the special representatives of the President of the United States were equally respectable, though somewhat less picturesque.

Mr. Wilson also relied heavily on Carranza's representative in Washington, Luis Cabrera, who appears to have prepared statements that were later issued in the name of the American Secretary of State. Cabrera seems to have made no secret of the purposes and plans by which the American government was going to be officially astonished years later. We quote from Mr. Buckley's testimony:

"In 1914 . . . I told Mr. Cabrera that the American government would not permit the Carranza government to drive the Americans out of Mexico and confiscate their property, as Mr. Cabrera stated the Mexican Government was going to do, whereupon Mr. Cabrera smiled and told me that he was surprised at the ignorance of the average American on public matters. He explained to me that Mr. Wilson was what he pleased to term an advanced liberal, a great Democrat, whose concern was for the welfare of the people of the world and was not limited to the narrow bounds of the United States . . . He said that Mr. Wilson was opposed

to capital in Mexico and everywhere else in the world, no matter to whom the capital belonged, and that in expelling the Americans from Mexico the Constitutionalists [Carranza's "party"] would receive the sympathy of the American Government."

It is clear that Cabrera was better informed than the American people of the intentions of the American government. American policy in this respect was best summarized in the bitter avowal made by the Captain of the United States Navy who was in command of the American squadron in Tampico in 1916 when an American, Mr. Warren, appealed to him for protection.

"The naval commander informed Mr. Warren that, of course, he was entitled to protection under the rules of international law, but that he, the Captain, represented a government which had repudiated international law; that the American squadron was there not to enforce international law, but to carry out the policy of the American Government, and that under this policy Americans abroad were not entitled to any protection whatever."

The testimony, unfortunately, does not show to what extent the government of the United States was informed of, or sympathized with, the notorious "Plan of San Diego," which was semi-secretly drawn up early in 1914 by a group of Mexican revolutionary leaders which did not include Carranza, unless he was represented by the bandits present who were at that time officially his allies. This "plan," which was certainly premature, called for the open conversion of the "Mexican Revolution" into an international racial war. White Mexicans were to be

massacred (except participants in the "plan"), but mestizos were to be spared. To a limited extent, something of this sort did happen during the innumerable "revolutions" which convulsed Mexico until 1925.

The rest of the "Plan of San Diego," however, was based on a miscalculation. Shortly before his fall, Madero entered into negotiations with the Minister of Japan for a close defensive and offensive alliance against the United States, and although there is no indication that the Japanese government seriously considered his proposals, Madero, encouraged by prominent members of the Japanese colony in Mexico City, seems to have regarded such an alliance as a certainty. Even while the cannon of his loyal and of his mutinous troops were demolishing Mexico City, Madero, according to Gutierrez de Lara (*The Mexican People*, New York, 1914), was hoping for American intervention, which would bring Japanese troops to his rescue!

The authors of the "Plan of San Diego" counted on Japanese support when they projected a "union of the Mexican people" to invade Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, massacre all white men, and reincorporate these states in the "Mexican Empire." Having attained this end, they would proceed to help the Negroes of our Southern States exterminate the whites and set up a "Black Republic."

The plan was based on another miscalculation when it took for granted the co-operation of Americans of Mexican descent. Pancho Villa is said never to have been able to understand why his raids into American territory did not start revolutions against the United States.

We do not know when this "plan" first came to the attention of the American government. One wonders, however, whether it can have been unknown to one of Mr. Wilson's personal representatives, Mr. Paul Fuller, who claimed to be an intimate friend of Pancho Villa and whose special business was to tell anyone who would listen about that thug's lofty ideals.

V

The background that we have sketched above will shed light on the series of acts by which the United States intervened in Mexico. Although the entire series merits close study, we can here do no more than summarily list the principal events.

(1) When Mr. Wilson assumed office, Huerta had already been recognized as head of the Mexican government by a large number of foreign governments. Wilson at once dispatched the odd Mr. Lind to inform Huerta that he must resign and hold elections in which he, being a murderer and usurper, would not be permitted to be a candidate. Since Huerta perversely refused to commit political suicide, this incredible meddling could not be kept secret and was freely admitted by President Wilson, who announced that it was the "mission" of the United States to promote "democracy" in Latin America, and implied that he had been appointed—presumably by God—to represent what he was pleased to call "the submerged eighty percent of the Mexican people."

As the Twelfth Edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, which we quote as an obviously neutral and very cautious source, dryly remarks, "This attitude marked a new phase in the foreign pol-

icy of the United States. It began a period of direct intervention." It was furthermore an intervention against the friends of the United States—for Huerta had assured the American Ambassador that he would respect all American interests — on behalf of its avowed enemies.

Latin Americans were puzzled by an act of incomprehensible folly, and shocked by the open violation of the accepted decencies of international relationships. In August, 1913, the United States became, as a commanding officer of her own navy would have to admit in bitterness and humiliation three years later, a nation "which had repudiated international law." That this repudiation was couched in the language of a prating prig did not soften the shock. But there was more to come.

(2) Mr. Wilson was most indignant when Huerta disobeyed the orders transmitted through Mr. Lind, and Washington began officially to fulminate against Huerta and to predict his proximate downfall. But responsible Mexicans supported Huerta, perhaps because he seemed the only alternative to such wild men as Carranza, Villa, Zapata, Obregón, and others who were conducting revolutions with almost unprecedented ferocity. In April, 1914, the arrest of some American marines at Tampico, although followed by their release and an apology, offered a pretext for an incident. American marines landed and, not without loss of life, occupied Vera Cruz, far to the south of Tampico.

President Wilson told the Congress that his purpose was to enforce respect for the American flag. Unfortunately, it was quite obvious, and was officially

admitted by Admiral Badger, that the purpose of the attack was to prevent the Hamburg-American steamer *Ypiranga* from landing munitions that had been ordered by Huerta. The United States Navy was at the same time charged with preventing the Mexican Navy from interfering with the landing of arms for the revolutionaries, especially Carranza and Villa. Later, when Carranza fired on American ships and these insults to the American flag were blandly overlooked, it was necessary for the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, to explain to the American press that the occupation of Vera Cruz had had nothing to do with the dignity or honor of the United States, because "the purpose was to force Huerta out of Mexico."

This hypocrisy excited disgust throughout Latin America.

(3) Since Huerta still obstinately refused to fall, a conference was held at Niagara Falls, supposedly to settle the question of Huerta's alleged insult to the American flag, with representatives from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile invited to attend as mediators. Huerta was represented by three distinguished Mexican lawyers who had taken no part in his government, but they proved to be no match for the Americans.

The Americans began by demanding the removal of Huerta, threatening to occupy Mexico if this were not done, and an understanding was finally reached that Huerta was to resign and be replaced as provisional president by a Mexican civilian who did not represent any faction and was not an adherent of any of the persons then contending for power. To this the Mexican delegation agreed.

The trick worked. Huerta officially

agreed to resign, and this news was immediately made public, thus effectively destroying the last of Huerta's prestige in Mexico and making certain his eventual downfall.

In the hope that this would occur promptly, the American government protracted as long as it could negotiations over the selection of the "neutral and uncommitted" provisional president who was to succeed Huerta, but finally the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, acting on the orders of President Wilson, had to expose the whole duplicity of the American government by bluntly declaring "Carranza *must* be provisional President and *permanent* President of Mexico!" That, of course, ended the "conference."

It must be remembered that the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile watched the United States outwit the simple-minded Mexicans who had believed in American honor.

It required another intervention on our part in Mexico before Carranza was able to lead his army into Mexico City to begin a few months of glorious rape and looting, even stripping homes of their furniture and libraries for sale to second-hand dealers. President Wilson's envoy, Mr. Lind, promptly praised Carranza and his troops for their "discipline and restraint."

Carranza was driven out by Zapata, who wanted his turn; Zapata was driven out by Villa; then Villa by Zapata—and Mexico collapsed into utter anarchy, for which informed opinion throughout Latin America held us morally responsible.

(4) In 1915, the United States summoned the Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala to a "Pan-American Confer-

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ence" to deliberate concerning joint recognition of a Mexican government. The countries concerned obeyed the summons reluctantly, because they properly believed that recognition is a matter which each nation must decide for itself, and furthermore they well knew that there was no government in Mexico to be recognized, since it would be mere mockery to apply that name to any one of the bandits then engaged in murder and looting. We spare the reader the details. After being lectured on the blessings of "democracy" and the character of Latin Americans by the American government, the Latin American representatives, summoned to a "final" session and subjected to various pressures, reluctantly yielded to a demand that they recognize Carranza as the government of Mexico. Washington immediately released this news to the press in a statement which was to the effect that "Latin America had achieved a great diplomatic triumph and had forced the United States to recognize Carranza."

The thoughts of the Latin American diplomats are not recorded, but both Spanish and Portuguese have a vocabulary that you will not find in the dictionaries.

(5) The American people, since our "Liberals" had not yet taught them their proper place in the world, disapproved of the murder of Americans on American soil by invading bandits from Mexico. This disapproval became so emphatic that President Wilson had to take action, and the result was General Pershing's expedition into Mexico in 1916, supposedly to capture Pancho Villa. General Pershing's instructions were carefully drawn to make it certain that the expedition would be a

failure, and would accomplish nothing but to make the United States seem ridiculous. The expedition also served the purpose of keeping the Americans quiet until they could get into a World War "to make the whole world safe for democracy."

Since Carranza and Villa were at war, Pershing's expedition was undertaken with the consent of Carranza, who was represented to the American people as a friend of the United States. The quality of this friendship is best illustrated by an editorial in the Carranza government's semi-official newspaper in Carranza's home town of Saltillo, written to instruct Mexicans in proper behavior toward the American troops: "Pull out eyes, snatch out hearts, tear open breasts, drink—if you can—the blood in the skulls of the invaders from the cities of Yankeeland."

The rhetoric merely makes explicit the sentiments of the "great democrats" whom we were so eager to see established in Mexico in place of Huerta, whom we suspected (rightly or wrongly) of intending to revive the policies of the wicked "dictator" Díaz. Now many Latin Americans, doubtless because they were reactionaries and did not foresee what standards of culture would predominate in the "United Nations" some forty years later, thought such sentiments barbarous, and did not wish to see them emulated in their own countries, all of which had some inhabitants who did not greatly differ from the Mexicans who had been mobilized by the bandits. The Latin Americans may not have been greatly concerned over Yankee skulls, but they had very definite views concerning the proper use of their own.

There was another aspect of the

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events in Mexico which only gradually became apparent. We do not know when the International Communist Conspiracy began to influence and manipulate Mexicans. It certainly did not create the bandits: criminals automatically begin open operations whenever law and order break down. It is possible, of course, that the Conspiracy was active behind the scenes in Mexico in 1914, but if it was, no one would then have regarded it as a factor worthy of consideration. The Conspiracy was chiefly known to the public through its terroristic subsidiary, the I. W. W., and even this was regarded as being, at most, a minor nuisance. Until they captured Russia, Bolsheviks seemed to be merely comic figures with a propensity for growing beards and carrying bombs.

Observers began to wonder about Mexico, however, when Carranza's agent, Cabrera, boasted that "the good part of Bolshevism was incorporated in the [Mexican] constitution of 1917." Cabrera went on to explain that this imitation of Bolshevism was the proper means of preventing Bolshevism from taking over in Mexico; and if some people thought this plausible at that time, we cannot be too scornful. The same paradox, now stale and withered, is still trotted out by our "intellectuals" to prevent Americans from perceiving what is happening when the Communists are in the process of taking over another country — and apparently it still works.

Matters became quite clear, however, when Mexico City was captured by a band of savage Yaqui Indians led by Obregón, who had the distinction of surpassing all his predecessors in the ingenuity of the outrages perpetrated on the helpless inhabitants. Obregón

was the open ally of the I.W.W., was financed by them, and demonstrated his allegiance to them, as soon as he had possession of Mexico City, by loading priests on cattle cars for export, and converting churches and parochial schools into headquarters of the I.W.W.

Now of course, responsible men in Latin America did not suspect the United States of promoting Communism — that idea probably never entered their heads until Franklin Roosevelt began to put pressure on them to recognize the Soviet Union — but they, uneasily aware that they were sitting on powder kegs in their own countries, could not fail to notice that the United States government, although it said that Obregón's conduct was regrettable, did not manifest any of the indignation and utterly unscrupulous animus that it had directed against Huerta, who had striven to maintain the decencies of civilized life. It seemed, therefore, that Obregón, the chief of savages and the open ally of international murderers, was somehow more "democratic" than Huerta. At all events, the United States, which should have taken the lead in dealing with an infection that could be disastrous to the whole hemisphere, was content to mumble a few perfunctory protests.

VI

Since the foregoing account of American policy may seem incredible to some readers, we shall digress long enough to remind them that the presidency of Woodrow Wilson was a really crucial period in American history.

It was an age of illusion. Many Americans entered it in euphoric dreams of the "New Freedom" they were going to enjoy when they had

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put about their throats the noose of the Income Tax — which, of course, could never be more than three or four percent for the obvious reason that no government could conceivably spend more than that. During this period they were so constantly told that they were living in a democracy that some of them actually forgot the difference between a democracy and the Republic guaranteed by the Constitution. And they came out of the period having solved all their problems by means of the incredible Eighteenth Amendment, which was based on the purely democratic principle that a government (if it can whip up enough votes in a plebiscite) has a right to make everyone do what is best for weaklings and fools.

It was an age of covert subversion, even yet largely undisclosed. Many of the assassins who directed the Bolshevik capture of Russia had been harbored and secretly trained in the United States. Seemingly innocent Communist fronts were in operation, and even the terroristic I. W. W., despite its organized violence and assassinations, found powerful protectors within the federal government.

This is not to suggest that Woodrow Wilson ever knowingly co-operated with Communists. He appears to have been a bigot who dignified his own opinions and wishes by identifying them as "the conscience of mankind." He simply refused to listen to responsible Americans who lived in Mexico and knew what the situation there was; he had no need for such information, since he knew, presumably by revelation, all about the "submerged eighty percent" who had, presumably by telepathy, appointed him their representa-

tive. And it is normal for the fanatic to believe that his higher purpose authorizes him to transcend the "narrow limits" of conventional honesty.

Mr. Wilson's famous boast that his experience of faculty politics while he was in Princeton University enabled him to handle professional politicians with ease reminds one of the prosperous yokel's boast that he has just taken a group of professional gamblers at poker. The game may have been less simple than he supposed.

Mr. Wilson led his country into a war which, whatever its justification in terms of American interest, he officially justified as a "war to end war." He may have believed that such a thing was possible. If he did, he could have believed anything.

At all events, it is to Mr. Wilson that we owe the introduction, by easy gradations, of the extraordinary notion that a President of the United States is elected to represent, not the American people, but the "whole world"—whatever that may mean. And his comparative indifference, if not actual hostility, toward the American citizens who were despoiled of their property, often outraged, and sometimes murdered by his pets in Mexico (for details, see the Senate hearings cited above) was one of the important steps in the development of what is now the working premise of our "Liberals," who have so consistently acted upon it that Americans have come to accept it without protest.

That premise, stripped of mawkish sentimentality and double-talk, is that the *American people, precisely because they have by their energy and ingenuity made themselves prosperous and powerful, are inferior beings who deserve to be taxed, exploited, degraded,*

and on occasion killed for the comfort and convenience of any bipeds that have been too lazy, stupid, or savage to work for themselves.

A nation that operates on such a premise could not win the respect of a village of head hunters in the Matto Grosso, to say nothing of the civilized inhabitants of South America or of any other continent in the world.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN *The Turning Point*

THE TURNING POINT in our relations came during the régime of Woodrow Wilson through the events that we have described above and minor incidents that we do not have space to recount.

At the beginning of that period the governments of Latin America respected the government of the United States as one that normally observed the decencies of international intercourse. At the end of that period the government of the United States was known to have repudiated international law, and to have staged such dishonest and cowardly maneuvers as the calling of a diplomatic conference to force Latin-American governments to "force" on us the policy that we dictated.

At the beginning of that period we had numerous and sincere friends in Mexico; at its end, many of them were dead and their families extinct.

At the beginning of that period we had many friends throughout Latin America; at its end, most of them were confuted and silenced.

What was worse, we compromised ourselves in the eyes of the many sagacious Latin Americans who were not our friends, but were our potential allies. The distinction is well illustrated

by the Peruvian scholar and diplomat, Francisco García Calderón, author of a book still fundamental to an understanding of Latin America and available in an English translation (*Latin America: Its Rise and Progress*, London, 1913).

García Calderón, son of the Peruvian President of the same name, and later Ambassador to France, was scarcely a "friend" of the United States. Deeply imbued with his own Spanish culture, which he loved and regarded as far superior to our own, he does not fall far short of Ferrero's views about the relative value of "Latin" civilization in comparison with the cultures of Germany and the United States, although he sees that the latter two differ greatly from one another. He is, furthermore, suspicious of the United States and even speaks of a "Yankee peril."

Writing in 1911, he could not quite believe that we were disinterested when we spent great sums of money and the time of many American technicians to provide Cuba with roads, schools, sanitation, and medical facilities; he therefore suspected us of an intention to annex that island sooner or later. He even wondered whether we might not carry out Jefferson's suggestion that our southern border could be extended to the Isthmus of Panama.

But, whether you liked it or not, the United States existed. García Calderón regarded us with a shrewd and discerning eye. He saw clearly that our dynamic individualism depended on the maintenance of the family and the home as the paramount social unit, and he perceived symptoms of decline in that primary source of our energies. He marvelled, moreover, at our reckless admission of immigrants, some of

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them obviously undesirable, in fantastic numbers, which he thought four to five times the maximum that we could absorb, and he concluded that this policy must have been set by employers who wished to keep wages at a minimum. He examined carefully the possibility that the United States might lose even the cohesion necessary to resist a determined attack by a major naval power, but concluded that that was, on the whole, unlikely. And barring rapid internal decay, he said, "nothing can check the onward march of the United States."

The prospect did not delight García Calderón, but he was a realist who could look objectively even at what he loved. He reviewed the economic status of Latin America and the underlying causes. Although the markets were at that time almost entirely in the hands of Europeans, he concluded that "On account of its very inferiority, South America cannot dispense with the influences of the Anglo-Saxon North. . . . South America has need of capital, of enterprising men, of bold explorers, and these the United States can supply." The aim of Latin America, therefore, should be the protection and preservation of its own culture, not a pipe-dream of economic equality.

Although García Calderón thought that the position of Latin America would be improved by unions of contiguous states to form five or six federations, he recognized that the basic weakness was the fact that even the cultivated classes had become "accustomed to leave everything to the initiative of the State." Young men normally sought lodgement in the parasitic and overgrown bureaucracies that were maintained for political reasons, be-

cause, despite all the labels, rhetoric, and announced plans, there were no political parties — only factions that followed a leader for the sake of the spoils, regardless of what "principles" he might think it expedient to enunciate.

A century of political chaos had produced a "lamentable exhaustion" and a fatal "disequilibrium of men and races." Centuries of miscegenation had produced in certain areas virile and sturdy hybrids that might have a real future, but in many more the result had been biological degeneration, and almost everywhere there were latent animosities that virtually precluded political and economic progress. Many countries exhibited an obvious and accelerating regression, and, on the whole, said García Calderón, "the continent is returning to its primitive barbarism." Therefore, "only plentiful European immigration," predominantly, if not exclusively, from the Latin countries of Europe, could enable Latin America to acquire the strength and vigor necessary for real independence and stability.

In the meantime, however, Latin America did not have the power to resist penetration by aggressive non-European nations — especially Russia, China, and Japan. The first two, however, had suffered crushing military defeats at the hands of Japan, which had become the dominant power in Asia and the most aggressive nation in the world. García Calderón deplored the folly of Latin Americans who imagined that they could counter the "Yankee peril" by encouraging the Japanese. That, he said, was simply suicidal, because no real understanding or even peace is possible with people who have

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a *fundamentally* different view of life, whereas, "in spite of essential differences, the Latin [American]s have certain common ties with the peoples of the [United] States: a long-established religion, Christianity, and a coherent, European, occidental civilization."

And so, when the chips are down, García Calderón is on our side—firmly and reliably on our side, not because he loves us, but because he loves his own country.

The distinction is vital—as vital today as when García Calderón wrote—if we are ever to attain a rational understanding with rational men in Latin America.

We have always had uncritical admirers in Latin America and even some romantic ones, such as the Cubans who were agitating for annexation around 1910 or the citizens of El Salvador who hoped that we would annex their country as an adjunct to the Panama Canal—and might have been the first to complain, had we done so. Such admiration is flattering, but it is mere romanticism, no more significant than the visitors from Latin America who profess to admire everything in the United States from hot dogs to the whining of Sinatra. With educated and cultivated Latin Americans, the best of whom are fully equal to the best of us, we must seek the kind of understanding that is possible between gentlemen who, within the framework of the same general culture, have differing tastes, but are bound together by the realization that they have vital interests in common.

These are the people whom we began to alienate by our sadistic and masochistic meddling in Mexico, and have almost consistently alarmed and repelled since 1933.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN *Other Causes*

OBVIOUSLY, we have not attempted to cover the whole range of our relations with Latin America. One could discourse at great length on a wide variety of topics, from the bitter book, *A Ilusão Americana*, written by an erudite and elegant Brazilian expatriate in Paris, to the landing of American marines in Nicaragua in 1926 at the request of the duly elected government, primarily to insure it against a threat of invasion from Mexico and to help it cope with a pro-Communist revolution financed from that country—an intervention which our "Liberals," for obvious reasons, would have you regard as an awful act of "outrageous imperialism."

It would be interesting to review one by one the other instances of American intervention in Latin America. Aside from the discharge of our obligations in Cuba and Panama, as provided in the constitutions of those countries, there are some twenty-one instances of armed intervention, ranging from the landing of marines for a few weeks to protect the lives and property of Americans in conformity with international law, to a partial occupation of Haiti for nineteen years to maintain order and administer customs in the absence of a responsible government. To these we should have to add numerous instances of diplomatic protection (e.g., to Venezuela in 1895) and administrative assistance (e.g., to the Dominican Republic as provided in the agreement of 1905 and treaty of 1907) granted at the request of various Latin-American governments, and other services, such as providing judges of unimpeachable integrity and impartiality for the Nica-

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ruguan Mixed Claims Commission in 1911.

Even a cursory review of these incidents would run to inordinate length and would involve us in questions beyond the scope of our inquiry. It could be argued, for example, as President Grant argued in 1870, that the United States has a certain moral responsibility toward the smaller nations of this hemisphere, and that our Senate therefore erred in rebuffing the people of Santo Domingo when they, by a formal referendum, asked that we annex their country and administer it as a colony. On the other hand, it could be argued that no such obligation exists, and that there was no reason why we should not have permitted the people of Haiti to revert to pure savagery and do their best to exterminate themselves. Why should we have spent our money and the lives of some of our soldiers to save them from themselves for nineteen years?

We are on solid ground only when we consider intervention for the protection of Americans and American interests. It is obviously the duty of our government to carry out such intervention whenever it becomes necessary, for a governmental policy that subordinates the interests of the United States to the interests of any other country or group of countries is simply treason. That fact is obvious to every American, except the poor wretches who, in our pseudo-intellectual opium dens, suck in narcotic vapors and escape from reality into the One World of dreams; it is also obvious to every foreigner capable of objective thought. All Latin Americans understandably regret the necessity of American intervention in any country south of the Rio Grande, but

unless they are carried away by irrational emotions, they recognize that the real responsibility for the intervention falls on the country that made it necessary, and that that country profited from the intervention, which probably saved the lives and property of a large number of its citizens.

So long as we act openly in our own interest, we are respected, and we least expose ourselves to injurious misinterpretation of our motives. It is only when we profess to act for "democracy" or "mankind" that we arouse suspicions and bitterness, for intelligent Latin Americans necessarily regard the idealist twaddle as either (a) hypocrisy masking some sinister purpose or (b) the raving of a wild-eyed Quixote whose gigantic stature and cracked brain makes him far more dangerous to his friends than to his foes.

We must mention one other factor in the formation of anti-American sentiment in Latin America. It is as obvious as the Purloined Letter, and as generally overlooked. Its effects are undoubtedly great, but cannot be measured precisely or even estimated. The great influx of students from Latin America to institutions of higher learning in the United States began during the First World War and constantly increased thereafter. Most of these young men (and women) were exposed to the influence of our "Liberal intellectuals," and many were doubtless taken in by pseudo-academic quackery.

We need here do no more than remind the reader that Communist penetration of our educational institutions began long ago. By 1924, when R. M. Whitney published his comprehensive *Reds in America*, it was a notorious fact that "colleges and universities are

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the feeding ground of the 'intellectual' Communists, and the agents of the party have been deliberately 'planted' in the educational institutions of the United States for the purpose of making converts of the young." The activity of these agents and other persons, chiefly mountebanks and racketeers, quickly made fashionable the empty-headed verbosity and infantile petulance of the perennial sophomores who were known as "parlor pinks" until they succeeded in stealing the word 'liberal.' In 1928, Professor Paul Shorey, the distinguished Platonist and one of America's greatest scholars, explicitly warned us that "Though the ordinary Main-Street American does not yet vote red, all intellectual America reads and talks pink. The clichés and commonplaces of modern radicalism are inculcated weekly in all the literary reviews without exception, and in at least 99 out of 100 of all university lectures and addresses. *We never hear anything else.*"

Now of course, "hate America!" has always been the *Leitmotif* of the addled eggheads and of the lucid monsters who manipulate them, and consequently "Liberals" and Communists have consistently inveighed against the supposed iniquities of the United States in its relations with Latin America. We in the United States have suffered from an intensive barrage of such propaganda for more than forty years; the persistent rant has been so effective that it has influenced a great many of our own citizens, but it has been far more persuasive in its influence on the Latin Americans who have been exposed to it in our colleges, in the pages of our "high brow" periodicals, and in the harangues of the American "Liberals" who are forever touring Latin America

as "ambassadors of good will." It is easy enough for us to see the tainted sources of this propaganda, but it has so dominated our professedly intellectual circles that a foreigner must be both mature and sagacious if he is to recognize, in what is touted as the "best in American thought," the utterances of the enemies of the United States.

You will do well to inspect a few current specimens of this propaganda. It will take only a few minutes to leaf through a most remarkable book entitled *Listen, Yankee!* (McGraw-Hill, New York; 192 pages, \$3.95). This tirade against the United States and the American people sounds like one of the more prolonged screams of the book's hero, Fidel Castro. The publishers, however, say that the author is C. Wright Mills, Professor of Sociology in Columbia University.

This disgraceful publication will disgust most of its readers in the United States, but it may have some appreciable effect elsewhere. The large weekly magazine of Communist Cuba, *Bohemia* (stolen from its owners, who now publish a periodical of the same title in Venezuela), published in its issue of 4 December, 1960, a photograph showing Professor Mills engaged in cerebration, an article lauding the "great scholar," whose works "have been translated into all [*sic*] the languages of the civilized world," for his "extraordinary accomplishment in international understanding," and the announcement that chapters of the book translated into Spanish would be published serially in *Bohemia*. One may be certain that the American professor's eulogy of America's enemy in Cuba will be circulated as widely as possible

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in Latin America.

A nineteen-page article in the *New Republic* for 12 September, 1960, is a little more subtle than Professor Mills' diatribe, and probably, therefore, more damaging. It follows the usual line: gabble about "living standards" and "hopeful social experiments;" smears directed against Batista, Trujillo, the Catholic hierarchy of Cuba, Ambassadors Gardiner and Smith, Senator Elender, and, by implication, anyone else who has told the truth about the Communist régime in Cuba; and impudent assertion that Castro began his career as "a young Havana lawyer" and that "there are no Soviet bases of any kind in Cuba" and that it is "reasonably certain that Fidel and the other top leaders of the Cuban government are not and never have been members of any Communist party either in Cuba or in exile."


The author of this boob-bait is one Samuel Shapiro, Assistant Professor of History in Michigan State University, where he is one of the stars of a "Latin-American Area Program" and probably sings his hymns to Castro *ex cathedra* to undergraduates, some of whom may actually believe him. He visited Argentina as a Fulbright Professor in 1959, and it is easy to imagine what kind of insight and understanding he conveyed to the Argentinian students who heard his lectures. Furthermore, Professor Shapiro's offensive against the United States is not confined to this hemisphere. He reports Latin-American affairs for *The Economist*, a strange weekly published in London for double-domes and distributed throughout the world by air mail. It combines good English and some accurate statistics with Keynesian eco-

nomics and the kind of international politics that invariably promotes Bolshevism. The *Economist's* notions about Latin America are well illustrated by an unsigned article in the issue, of 26 November, 1960, in which our brief naval patrol of the western Caribbean to prevent Cuban troops from landing in Guatemala is ridiculed as "the use of warships against ideas," and the usual bunk about "underfed and underprivileged populations" is used to support the bland pronouncement that "destroyers are not a good barrier against the spread of Cuba's ideas to the Latin-American masses."

The two specimens that we have mentioned are current and therefore more brazen than the propaganda to be found in comparable publications twenty or thirty or forty years ago, but the earlier productions of our self-styled "intellectuals," though less audacious in expression, were probably more efficacious in exciting antagonism toward the United States in Latin America.

The cumulative effect of this propaganda must have been great indeed, and one wishes that there were some way to measure the proportion of anti-American pronouncements in Latin America that are merely echoes from our own lecture halls and our own periodicals.

We may derive some comfort, however, from the fact that the number of "Liberal intellectuals" in the United States has decreased slightly in recent months. When Mr. Richard Taber of the Columbia Broadcasting System learned that there was testimony and documentary evidence indicating that he had committed perjury before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, he caught the first plane for



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Havana. A subpoena from the Subcommittee inspired another high-minded idealist, who had been Mr. Taber's accomplice in promoting the Communist front called "Fair Play for Cuba," to follow Mr. Taber's example. Mr. Kenneth Tynan of the *New Yorker* magazine, who had sworn that he was not a Communist, is said to have discovered the superiority of English climate before he could be recalled for questions concerning a tissue of lies that he had published in *Harper's Magazine* in an attempt to ridicule the Subcommittee. It is to be hoped that this is but the beginning of a long-awaited mass migration.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Age of Treason

When the necessary materials have become available and have been collected and weighed, it will be possible to write a very important, and possibly crucial, chapter in the history of our relations with Latin America.

It is well known that when Franklin Delano Roosevelt, having bamboozled the American people with pledges of drastic reductions in governmental expenditures and powers, crawled into the White House to begin his long Saturnalia, he opened the way to a motley horde of half-crazed fanatics, greedy adventurers, weird degenerates, and covert traitors who multiplied so rapidly and acquired such power that the survivors and their spawn still control many of the vital centers of our government.

Parts of the foreign policy of that nightmarish régime have been sufficiently explored to leave no doubt concerning the basic purposes and techniques. From the first attempts to pro-

mote a war in Europe to the disastrous results of the Great Crusade to Save the Soviet, the appalling record has been made clear in Professor Charles Callan Tansill's *Back Door to War*, Admiral Robert A. Theobald's *Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, George N. Crocker's *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's *America's Retreat from Victory*, and a dozen more. But no one, so far as we know, has made a comparable study of what Roosevelt, filching a phrase from President Hoover, called his "Good Neighbor Policy."

Some of the effects of the Roosevelt régime on Latin America may be easily surmised. The very spectacle of what was happening to the United States was in itself demoralizing. What, for example, must have been the reaction of Latin-American diplomats and observers to such measures as a "farm program," designed, as was never a great secret and is now generally admitted, by agents of the Communist Conspiracy to reduce American farmers to legalized serfdom? What must have been their reaction to the policy of creating a bribed electorate to destroy the American Republic? What, for that matter, must have been their reaction to the personal character of prominent officials in Washington? When a very high official of the State Department was beaten up by his husky black "husband," the most amusing quip that circulated in Washington, involving a Spanish pun both untranslatable and unprintable, was credited to a Latin-American ambassador; but it would have been more interesting to learn that ambassador's candid opinion of the whole freak-show to which he was accredited.

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When we turn to the specific acts that constituted the "Good Neighbor Policy," we could list a hundred, but the full information requisite for a positive determination of the purposes of each act is not yet available, while only a prolonged and close study of all of them could disclose a consistent and indubitable pattern.

In 1933, for example, Cuba began a series of revolutions. Under the provisions of the treaty by which we recognized the independence of Cuba, and under the integral part of the Cuban constitution that was somewhat misleadingly called the Platt Amendment, the United States was obliged to maintain order, but conspicuously disregarded its responsibilities. Early in the series an American tourist was killed. This gave Roosevelt an opportunity to crack a joke that notified an amazed world that under the New Order in Washington the shooting of American citizens abroad would be viewed with hilarity. And then, on the grounds that Cuba, which had had only five presidents in ten months, had attained exemplary political stability, the Platt Amendment was formally abrogated on 29 May 1934.


The net result, as is now obvious to everyone, was to prepare the way for Castro, but what, specifically, was in the mind of the persons who excogitated this policy in 1934? Who, for that matter, were they? It is not unlikely that they hoped that Professor Grau San Martín, a notorious collaborator with the Communist Conspiracy who had held power for four months in 1933, would return to office and establish an enduring dictatorship. If this was the plan, it was frustrated by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. As a

matter of fact, Professor Grau did return to power in 1944, when, with the aid of the Communists and the criminal gangs with which he was closely associated, he won the elections as successor to President Batista. He promptly proclaimed an anti-American policy, but his energies appear to have been chiefly absorbed by the efforts which won him the distinction of having stolen more money from the national treasury than any other holder of office in the history of Cuba. Grau had time, however, to entrench the Communists in the Cuban government and to promote the Conspiracy in many other ways. He was able to return to Cuba and become a candidate again in 1958, and it may be significant that it was not until after he was defeated in the election that the Kremlin and its allies began to give Fidel Castro all-out support in Cuba.

Some light on these events may be derived from Fulgencio Batista's recently-published *RESPUESTA . . .* (Ediciones Botas, Mexico City; 545 pages, price not stated). The book, although obviously an *apologia pro vita sua* and therefore to be used with caution, and although primarily devoted to the events of 1958-1960, contains a great deal of detailed information concerning the circumstances in which Batista first came to political prominence in 1933. It is clear that Batista has not told the full story, but there is no reason to doubt that he is correct when he says that during his *first* régime he had to accept the support of the Communists and even co-operate with them in order to conciliate the government of the United States.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (Devin-Adair, New York; 230 pages, \$4.50) is primarily a well-documented account of the Communist conquest that began with the landing of the notorious Communist agent, Fidel Castro, in December, 1956, but the study incidentally shows that the antecedents of that disaster to the United States go back to the "New Deal."

Mr. Weyl reminds us that in Roosevelt's State Department Latin-American affairs were under the direction of the notorious Laurence Duggan, who was later identified as an agent of the Soviet Secret Police. Mr. Weyl further reminds us that it was during Duggan's tenure of office that our Latin-American diplomatic service was embellished by the employment of the two men who now hold high posts in that service and were recently identified, in the sworn testimony of Ambassadors Gardiner and Smith, as the members of the State Department who were directly and unmistakably responsible for promoting the Communist conquest of Cuba by Fidel Castro. Mr. Weyl also calls attention to the very interesting coincidence that both of these men, Roy R. Rubottom and William Arthur Wieland, were present in Bogotá when Castro was one of the leaders of the attempted Communist revolution there in 1948. He adds that Mr. Wieland, before Duggan recruited him for the State Department, had spent some time in Cuba as an associate of a gang of assassins known as the "ABC." It is to be presumed, therefore, that Mr. Wieland, who spent but one year in college, obtained in Cuba the education that qualified him for diplomatic service under the New Deal.

From such facts we can, of course, draw inferences that are very likely to be correct, but it is clear that we need a detailed and documented study of the whole course of American policy toward Cuba since 1933. It might be even more shocking.

Another exploit of the first Roosevelt administration was the negotiation with Panama of a treaty finally signed in 1936. It is quite clear from the book by Mr. Harding which we cited in Chapter 12 that had this treaty been drafted by a commission of Soviet engineers, generals, and experts at subversion for the purpose of preventing the United States from (a) making necessary improvements in the Panama Canal, (b) defending the Canal against either open attack or sabotage, and (c) opposing a Communist take-over of Panama, it would have contained precisely the provisions that were actually written into the treaty. So gross and flagrant was the crippling of the United States by that treaty that it is impossible to believe that the persons who negotiated it were not fully aware that they were betraying the interests and security of their country. But no detailed account of these negotiations or determination of primary responsibility is yet available, so far as we know.

After the United States rescued the Soviet Union from internal collapse by recognizing the sub-human monsters in the Kremlin as a legitimate government in 1933 and by encouraging the exportation of American equipment and technical skill to build up Soviet power, the governments of Latin America were urged to enter into diplomatic relations with the enemies of mankind. We do not yet know the

Latin America

exact nature or extent of the pressures that the United States exerted on behalf of the Communist Conspiracy, but it seems clear that on some occasions, at least, they exceeded the bounds of diplomatic propriety. In Brazil, for example, the leader of the Communist Party, Luis Carlos Prestes, having led an armed insurrection, had been sentenced to a term in prison. It is known that the United States made diplomatic representations to Brazil concerning the inhumanity of separating Prestes from his family, and not long thereafter Prestes was released—just in time to be elected to the Brazilian Senate. Whether the intervention of Washington was a decisive factor in procuring the release of Prestes is not yet known.

One could multiply examples indefinitely. Almost every month from 1933 to 1961 provides some example of a policy or gesture that was ultimately funest in its consequences to the United States; these are now conveniently forgotten or explained away as mere bungling by privileged dunces, but obviously each requires careful elucidation.

Mr. Duggan, we have said, was for many years in charge of Latin-American affairs in our State Department. He was positively identified as an agent of the Soviet Secret Police, and his mysterious death in 1948, whether suicide or murder, effectively prevented a public trial, possible confession, and identification of his accomplices. No one will entertain any doubt as to the kind of person Duggan brought into the State Department in Washington and sent into American embassies and consulates in Latin America. But we urgently need a full list of those persons and we urgently need to obtain

from them a full account of their activities in testimony given under oath before the appropriate committees of the Senate.

Even without such testimony, much would doubtless be disclosed by a careful study of the available records by someone who would bring to the task Professor Tansill's acumen, diligence, and courage. Such an account of the "Good Neighbor Policy" would at least be as revealing and painful to the American reader as was that eminent scholar's *Back Door to War*—and there is a very good chance that it might be as damning as the story of the betrayal of China into the hands of the Communist Conspiracy. The disclosures, though probably less spectacular, might show a multiplicity of actions and actors that would be equally shocking. Indeed, those disclosures might force the American people to remember at last that (a) the International Communist Conspiracy has been at war with us continuously and without intermission for almost half a century, and (b) the Constitution of the United States makes provision for the punishment of treason.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

L'Envoi

WE CAN PUNISH TREASON; history punishes folly.

In Latin America, as throughout the world, we as a people have long refused to look upon reality. We have filled our minds with hallucinations about "democracy," the "underprivileged," a "warless world," and other figments of disordered fancy. And from the day on which we as a nation acquiesced in the mad notion that we elected governments to serve, not ourselves and our interests, but the "larger

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interests of mankind," we began not only to destroy ourselves, but also to bring disaster upon the civilized world. Like Hercules in his madness, we turned our terrible strength against all that we, as rational men, should hold dear.

And so today, as we bleed ourselves to nourish the Kremlin's satraps in Bolivia, Venezuela, and many other parts of the world, and as we insanely apply diplomatic and economic sanctions to destroy our last friend in the Caribbean and to make of the Domini-

can Republic another Cuba, we see, leering triumphantly and greedily at us across the Straits of Florida, monsters from the primeval abyss. .

In this year 1961 history gives us one last chance. If the American people are too blind or too cowardly to take that chance, then, whether or not we as individuals deserve it, you and I and all that we hold dear under the vast sky that arches from the Atlantic to the Pacific must suffer the doom that history mercilessly imposes on fools.

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
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
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